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T
he evidence is clear. On the whole, America’s central cities are
coming back. Employment is up, populations are growing, and
many urban real estate markets are hotter than ever, with
increasing numbers of young people, empty-nesters, and others
choosing city life over the suburbs.
Unfortunately, not all cities are fully participating
in this renaissance. An examination of the perform-
ance of 302 U.S. cities on eight indicators of eco-
nomic health and residential well-being reveals that
65 are lagging behind their peers. Most of these
cities—and their larger regions—are older industrial
communities that are still struggling to make a suc-
cessful transition from an economy based on routine
manufacturing to one based on more knowledge-
oriented activities. Some others are simply dominated
by the low-wage employment sectors that today char-
acterize much of the American economy. But the out-
comes are largely the same: While many of these
cities have strong pockets of real estate appreciation
and revitalization, on the whole they remain beset by
slow (or no) employment and business growth, low
incomes, high unemployment, diminishing tax bases,
and concentrated poverty—remnants of five decades
of globalization and technological change, and the
dramatic shift of the country’s population away from
the urban core.
These cities weren’t always in such a tenuous posi-
tion. To the contrary, they were once the economic,
political, and cultural hubs of their respective
regions, and the engines of the nation’s economic
growth. They were vibrant communities where new
ideas and industries were conceived and cultivated,
where world-class universities educated generations
of leaders, where great architecture and parks
became public goods, and where glistening down-
towns grew up within blocks of walkable, tree-lined
neighborhoods where the middle-class swelled and
thrived. They were, in short, physical testaments to
the innovation and spirit that shaped the nation and
its citizens. 
And so they can be again. This report provides a
framework for understanding how to restore prosper-
ity in America’s struggling cities, particularly those in
the Northeast and Midwest. Targeted at state and
local government, business, and civic leaders
Restoring Prosperity: The State Role in
Revitalizing America’s Older Industrial Cities
describes the challenges facing these communities,
the unprecedented opportunity that exists to leverage
their many assets, and a policy agenda to advance
their renewal. 
The report underscores three central messages: 
●1 Given their assets, the moment is ripe for the
revival of older industrial urban economies. Older
industrial cities possess a unique set of characteris-
tics and resources that, if fully leveraged, could be
converted into vital competitive assets. These include
distinctive physical features—including waterfronts,
walkable urban grids, public transit, and historic
architecture; important economic attributes—such as
dense employment centers,
universities and medical
facilities (often referred to as
“eds and meds”), and, for
some cities, proximity to
more economically robust
metropolitan areas; and rich
social and cultural ameni-
ties—like public art, theater,
sports, and museums.
Moreover, older industrial
cities are still important cen-
ters of regional identity,
inspiring a sense of pride and place, which, while
often abstract, can be the first seed from which to
nurture the momentum for change. 
After decades of painful economic restructuring,
the time is now for these cities to seize upon new
trends and attitudes that have begun to revalue their
special qualities. Major demographic shifts—robust
immigration, an aging population, and changing fam-
ily structures—are altering the size, makeup, and
locational choices of the nation’s households, to the
benefit of the cities that offer the opportunities and
amenities these groups seek. Economic trends—glob-
alization, the demand for educated workers, the
increasing role of universities—are providing cities
with an unprecedented chance to capitalize upon
their economic advantages and regain their competi-
tive edge. And forward-thinking political leaders and
constituencies—businesses, local and state elected
officials, major foundations, and key environmental
and community organizations—are speaking more
eloquently and more often about market-based urban
development, reflecting these groups’ growing aware-
ness of the nexus between city revitalization and
competitive, sustainable metropolitan growth.
The impact of these forces is already apparent. The
1990s brought a sea change in how urban areas are
viewed—as places in which to invest, conduct busi-
ness, live, and visit. This has resulted in the turn-
around of many cities—from Chicago to
Chattanooga—such that they are once again innova-
tive, competitive, high-quality communities where
their residents have the choices and opportunities
needed to thrive. It has helped spark a resurgence 
in many downtowns and inner-city neighborhoods,
even in cities that continue to struggle with broad
economic malaise. And it demonstrates the potential
for all cities to reverse the vicious cycle of decline of
the past several decades and realize a brighter eco-
nomic future. 
●2 States have an essential role to play in the
revitalization of older industrial cities, but they
need a new urban agenda for change. The revital-
ization of older industrial cities necessarily starts with
local leaders, who must develop and articulate their
own vision for success, and the means by which to
realize it. But they can’t go it alone. In order for
cities to reach their true economic potential, their
states must engage—on multiple fronts. States estab-
lish the rules under which local governments must
operate, deciding the form of taxes and fees that
municipalities can impose on residents and busi-
nesses, as well as the structure of local governance.
States help design the physical skeleton of metropoli-
tan areas, by helping determine how and where major
capital and infrastructure projects get built. States
help shape the quality of regional economic growth,
through their substantial investments in K–12 educa-
tion, higher education, and economic development.
Finally, states create the opportunity structure for
low- and middle-income residents, by administering
myriad federal- and state-funded social programs that
impact families’ ability to improve their incomes and
build wealth. 
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All told, cities are in large part creatures of
states, therefore state actions—and inactions—
have an enormous effect on their overall well-
being. Unfortunately, over the past half century
state policies and practices have generally not
been favorable to urban areas. At best, these com-
munities have been treated with benign neglect,
with state programs and investments focused pre-
dominately on managing urban decline, as opposed to
stimulating economic recovery. At worst, state poli-
cies and investments have actually worked against
cities, facilitating the migration of people and jobs
(and the tax base they provide) to the metropolitan
fringe, while reinforcing the deterioration of the core. 
Ultimately, states have the potential to help restore
prosperity in the nation’s older industrial cities—if
they make revitalizing urban economies the central
element of urban policy. This requires that states
focus their investments, overhaul outdated and coun-
terproductive policies, and experiment with innova-
tive strategies that leverage these communities’
assets. And it requires, above all, that state policies,
practices, and investment strategies reflect a holistic
“urban agenda” that cuts across what are typically
separate and siloed policy areas. Such an agenda
should have five primary objectives: 
• Fix the Basics. First and foremost, states need to
ensure that older industrial cities are safe, fiscally
healthy communities where children are provided
the same opportunities as their suburban counter-
parts. This means implementing policies and pro-
grams that help lower prison recidivism rates and
reduce crime; improve neighborhood schools and
the instruction that takes place within them; and
create a competitive cost climate for families and
businesses. 
• Build on Economic Strengths. Second, states
need to do their part to help older industrial cities
understand and cultivate their unique economic
attributes so as to foster a “high road” economy.
To this end, states should help cities reinvigorate
their downtowns; invest in industries—eds and
meds, culture and entertainment, advanced man-
ufacturing, small businesses, and others—that
play to cities’ and metropolitan areas’ strengths;
and support expanded transit links and cross-
regional cooperation to enhance the economic
connectivity between metropolitan areas. 
• Transform the Physical Landscape. Third,
states need to recognize and leverage the physical
assets of cities that are uniquely aligned with the
preferences of the changing economy, and then
target their investments and amend outmoded
policies so as to help spur urban redevelopment.
States should focus their resources on upgrading
crumbling infrastructure in cities and older areas;
provide support for major projects—such as
waterfront redevelopment or improving large pub-
lic parks—that have the potential to catalyze rein-
vestment in the core; and implement laws and
policies that encourage, rather than inhibit, the
management and marketability of vacant and
underutilized urban properties. 
• Grow the Middle Class. Fourth, states need to
improve the economic condition of low-income
older industrial city residents. This requires that
states invest in state-of-the-art vocational training
systems that give residents the skills they need to
compete; give low-wage workers ready access to
the work benefits they deserve to make work pay;
and help low-income families to build wealth and
assets through programs and legislation that
reduce the costs of being poor.
• Create Neighborhoods of Choice. Finally, states
need to ensure that cities have strong, healthy
neighborhoods that are attractive to families with
a range of incomes. This requires that state hous-
ing subsidies be flexible enough to be used to
build a mix of unit types at varying prices through-
out metropolitan areas; that they appropriate
resources to help localities leverage the market
potential of under-served urban neighborhoods;
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and that they enact historic preservation, building
code reform, and other programs that help main-
tain and stabilize homes and communities. 
●3 The overall benefits of city revitalization—for
families, for suburbs, for the environment, and
ultimately for states—are potentially enormous.
Not only do states have the power to positively affect
urban economies, but they also have a strong ration-
ale to do so. With over 16 million people and nearly
8.6 million jobs, older industrial cities remain a
vital—if undervalued—part of our economy. These
cities contain billions of dollars of sunk and ongoing
state investments in urban infrastructure such as
roads, transit, sewer and water systems, and public
facilities. State funding for urban school systems,
community colleges and public universities constitute
a large and growing portion of state budgets. And
states invest substantially—year in, year out—in the
low- and moderate-income families who live in cities,
through a myriad of social programs. Yet most state
governments have paid little attention as to how
much, and to what end, they are spending on cities
and their residents, and how they could be getting
more bang for their buck. 
The above agenda offers a new approach to state
urban policy that, in the end, will substantially
increase the return on state investments, in manifold
ways. Restoring prosperity in older industrial cities
will lead to a reduction in unemployment and
poverty, a rise in incomes and wealth, and an
improved quality of life for urban families. Restoring
prosperity in older industrial cities will increase the
jobs, amenities, and housing choices available to 
suburban residents, enhance the regional market for
business location, raise both urban and suburban
property values, and improve the overall competitive-
ness of metropolitan areas. And restoring prosperity
in older industrial cities will increase their attractive-
ness as places in which to live and work, leading to 
a more efficient use of land, a decrease in energy
consumption, a reduction in harmful emissions, and
more sustainable regional growth. Ultimately, this all
adds up to stronger, healthier, more productive cities
and regions that are a boon to, rather than a drain
on, state budgets—evidence, to be sure, of money
well spent. 
Moving a real reform agenda for older industrial
cities will naturally be an organic process that will
demand the patience, flexibility, and commitment of
many and diverse actors working within and across
political boundaries. Most importantly, it demands
that cities, regions, and states organize themselves 
for success: 
•At the local level, city leaders, with support from
their states, must make the competent, clean,
transparent, and technologically savvy administra-
tion of government operations and services their
highest priority, with the goal of creating a
healthy and receptive climate for business growth
and retention. At the same time, they must also
work to build strong coalitions of innovative
thinkers, actors, and stakeholders to develop and
implement a competitive, long-term strategy for
revitalization. 
•At the metropolitan level, cities and suburbs need
to work together to bolster opportunities in, and
the marketability of, their regions as a whole.
States should promote such collaboration by pro-
viding resources to first-suburb coalitions,
regional workforce alliances, and metropolitan
planning organizations working across local
boundary lines, and by enabling the consolidation
of governmental functions that are clearly
regional in scope. 
•At the state level, urban leaders must band
together across cities and regions to advance a
state reform agenda like the one presented here.
State leaders, for their part, need not only to
engage in specific policy reforms, but also to look
for ways to reorganize their programmatic initia-
tives and agencies so they can be more effective
for the families and communities they are
designed to serve. 
For the first time in many decades, there is reason
to be truly optimistic about the future of America’s
older industrial cities. Advancing beyond hope, how-
ever, requires a vision of the possible—and the will to
achieve it. ■
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I. Introduction
W
alk around Baltimore, Maryland and you are likely to
see the black and yellow “I love city life” bumper
sticker pasted on cars and inside store windows. In a
Rust Belt city in a largely suburban nation, this mes-
sage—for all its simplicity—makes a bold statement.
In four words, it sums up why many city dwellers
have chosen a lifestyle that, for over a half century,
Americans have broadly disavowed. While the slogan
surely means different things to different people,
embedded in it is a clear sense of pride in not only a
particular community, but in having chosen a road
less traveled. It pays tribute to the
distinctive attributes and diverse
amenities that define urban living.
And in some small way, it might
even portend a shift in how we as a
nation view places we had essentially left for dead. 
This report is about Baltimore. It’s also about
Buffalo and Bridgeport, Scranton and Saginaw,
Providence and Pittsburgh, and 58 other “older
industrial cities” that share a similar set of economic
challenges. Typically labeled as “distressed,” “declin-
ing,” or “weak,” for the past several decades the per-
vasive image of these cities has been one of empty
downtowns, deteriorating neighborhoods, and strug-
gling families. Still grappling to overcome the painful
legacy of severe industrial decline
and population loss—forces that
have had a particularly severe
impact on much of the
Northeast and Midwest—these
cities simply haven’t seen the
widespread economic revital-
ization now being enjoyed by so many other urban
areas around the nation. 
But as the bumper sticker suggests, these cities are
about much more than their economic woes. 
With over 16 million people and nearly 8.6 mil-
lion jobs, older industrial cities remain a vital—if
undervalued—part of the economy,
particularly in states where they
are heavily concentrated, such as
Ohio and Pennsylvania. They also
have a range of other physical,
economic, and cultural attributes that, if fully lever-
aged, can serve as a platform for their renewal. In
fact, major demographic and economic trends are
presenting these cities with their best chance for a
comeback in decades, with changing household
structures, globalization, and technological advances
causing a revaluation of the density and diversity
that sets urban areas apart from newer suburban
communities. 
Older industrial cities are already experiencing
some of the benefits of these changes: Many of
their downtowns are seeing a new influx of private
investment, as are some of their neighborhoods,
with new residents, new buildings, and new firms
providing new life to city streets, and new revenues
for city bank accounts. But in the face of wide-
spread economic malaise, these pockets of recovery
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aren’t enough. Good things are happening—but they
need to happen more, and more extensively, in order
to truly turn these cities around. 
Public policy is crucial to this process—but it can’t
take the same old tack. If older industrial cities are to
fully capitalize on the positive trends now at hand,
government leaders—working in partnership with a
range of for-profit and nonprofit stakeholders—need
to design and implement a new urban agenda, one
aimed not at managing these cities’ economic
decline, but at stimulating their economic revival.
Cities, to be sure, must necessarily take the lead in
developing their own vision for long-term revitaliza-
tion, and a strategy by which to achieve it. But states
can and should be a powerful ally in helping cities
carry that strategy out. Though often overlooked,
states have a huge influence on cities and their resi-
dents—through an array of policies and an enormous
amount of investment they determine the geography
of governance, the fiscal playing field for municipali-
ties and school districts, and the location and quality,
in part, of regional economic growth, and help shape
the opportunities available for low- and middle-
income families. Yet, for all this, states haven’t gener-
ally acted in ways that serve cities’ best interests—at
a tremendous opportunity cost to the millions of peo-
ple that call these communities home, the wider eco-
nomic regions of which they are part, and ultimately,
to all those who live, work, do business, and pay taxes
in states that are themselves striving and struggling to
remain competitive in the new economy.
That has to change. 
The purpose of this report is to mobilize governors
and legislative leaders, as well as local constituencies,
behind an asset-oriented agenda for reinvigorating
the market in the nation’s older industrial cities. The
report begins by identifying and describing these
cities and discussing some of the economic, demo-
graphic, and policy “drivers” behind their current
condition. It then makes a case for why the moment
is ripe for revitalizing urban economies, offers a five-
part agenda for how states can help cities get there,
and describes why anyone should care that they do.
Finally, it lays out how local, regional, and state gov-
ernment, business, and civic leaders should organize
themselves to move such an agenda forward—and
ultimately ensure that America’s older industrial cities
are again innovative, vibrant, high-quality communi-
ties where a love for “city life” no longer seems quite
so brazen. ■
II. Older Industrial
Cities in the U.S.
So what do we mean by the term “older industrial cities”? How do we employ the definition? And to which cities does this moniker apply? 
The term “older industrial cities” in this report
describes a particular set of communities that over
the past several decades have experienced the steady
loss of businesses and jobs, and whose role in the
economy, and the economic stability of their resi-
dents, has diminished as a result. But
while even casual observers of the
urban landscape might be able to
rattle off a list of places that meet
this description, developing a com-
prehensive inventory of these cities
requires more than a bit of educated
guesswork. Rather, it demands a rigor-
ous empirical analysis of how a large
cross-section of cities fares on indicators of economic
health and vitality. 
To this end, we began with a dataset of 302
Census-defined principal U.S. cities that met at least
one of the following criteria in either 1990 or 2000:1
• Had at least 50,000 people and were the largest
city in a metropolitan area; 
• Were at least 50 percent of the population of the
largest city in a metropolitan area; or
• Had a population of at least 150,000, regardless
of whether or not they were the largest city in a
metropolitan area.
These cities were then assessed according to their
performance on eight economic indicators,
divided into two distinct groups. One
group of indicators measures cities’ eco-
nomic growth during the 1990s based on
growth in employment, growth in
annual payroll, and growth in establish-
ments.2 The second group measures
the economic well-being of city resi-
dents in 2000 based on per capita income,
median household income, poverty rate, unemploy-
ment rate, and labor force participation rate. The two
sets of indicators were used to create two indices of
economic health: City Economic Condition, and
Residential Economic Well-Being. We then ranked
the 302 cities based on their scores on each index
(See the Appendix).3
Based on those rankings, the cities were divided
into thirds, with the top third of cities considered
“strong” on that index, the middle third “moderate,”
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Indentification of the 65 older industrial cities is based on eight indicators of 
economic health and residential well-being
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and the bottom third “weak.” This allowed us to cre-
ate a series of typologies by grouping the cities
according to the nine possible combinations of strong,
moderate, and weak economic health as measured by
the two indices. Those 65 cities considered weak on
both the City Economic Condition index and the
Residential Economic Well-Being index were desig-
nated as “weak.” At the other end of the spectrum
were 57 “strong” cities that scored in the highest third
on each index. The remaining 180 cities fell into one
of seven other strong-moderate-weak combinations.
The focus here is on that bottom fifth of the
dataset—the 65 “older industrial cities” (see box on
p. 14) that are still struggling to boost their
economies and increase opportunity for the over 
16 million people that call these places home.4 These
cities come in all shapes and sizes: Almost half (32)
had less than 100,000 residents in 2000, over a 
quarter (18) had populations between 100,000 
and 250,000, and 10 had populations between a
quarter of a million and a half million. Only five 
of these cities had more than 500,000 residents, 
with Philadelphia (1,517,550) and Los Angeles
(3,694,820) the only members of the group with 
over 1 million.5
Definition Source
City Economic Condition Indicators
Change in Employment Change in the number of jobs by place U.S. Department of Housing and
of work, 1990–2000 Urban Development, State of the 
Cities Data Systems, Census Data 
1990 and 2000
Change in Annual Payroll Change in annual wages of the county U.S. Census Bureau, 
containing the majority of city residents, County Business
1990–2000* Patterns 1990 and 2000 
Change in Establishments Change in the number of establishments 
in the central county (see above), 
1990–2000
Residential Economic Well-Being Indicators
Median Household Income Median income of city households, 2000 U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 
State of the Cities Data Systems,  
Census 2000
Unemployment Rate Employed residents as a percent of 
residents in the labor force, 2000
Poverty Rate Percent of residents with household 
incomes below the poverty line, 2000
Labor Force Participation Rate Percent of working-age residents in the 
labor force, 2000
Per Capita Income Total income per city resident, 2000 U.S. Census of Population and 
Housing 2000
*If city population was more or less evenly split between two counties, both were included.  The five counties that are contiguous with the
New York City boroughs were combined. 
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Over three-quarters of older industrial cities have less than 250,000 residents
Under 100,000 100,000 to 249,000 250,000 to 499,000 Over 500,00
City Population City Population City Population City Population
Warren, OH 46,832 Erie, PA 103,717 Newark, NJ 273,546 Milwaukee, WI 596,974
Binghamton, NY 47,380 Allentown, PA 106,632 Buffalo, NY 292,648 Baltimore, MD 651,154
Danville, VA 48,411 Beaumont, TX 113,866 Cincinnati, OH 331,285 Detroit, MI 951,270
Harrisburg, PA 48,950 Hartford, CT 121,578 Pittsburgh, PA 334,563 Philadelphia, PA 1,517,550
Mansfield, OH 49,346 New Haven, CT 123,626 St. Louis, MO 348,189 Los Angeles, CA 3,694,820
Altoona, PA 49,523 Flint, MI 124,943 Miami, FL 362,470
Huntington, WV 51,475 Bridgeport, CT 139,529 Fresno, CA 427,652
Pine Bluff, AR 55,085 Syracuse, NY 147,306 Long Beach, CA 461,522
Rocky Mount, NC 55,893 Springfield, MA 152,082 Cleveland, OH 478,403
Lancaster, PA 56,348 Dayton, OH 166,179 New Orleans, LA 484,674
Port Arthur, TX 57,755 Providence, RI 173,618
Terre Haute, IN 59,614 Jackson, MS 184,256
Utica, NY 60,651 San Bernardino, CA 185,401
Saginaw, MI 61,799 Richmond, VA 197,790
Schenectady, NY 61,821 Shreveport, LA 200,145
Merced, CA 63,893 Rochester, NY 219,773
Springfield, OH 65,358 Birmingham, AL 242,820
Muncie, IN 67,430 Stockton, CA 243,771
Scranton, PA 76,415
Albany, GA 76,939
Kalamazoo, MI 77,145
Santa Maria, CA 77,423
Canton, OH 80,806
Reading, PA 81,207
Decatur, IL 81,860
Youngstown, OH 82,026
Trenton, NJ 85,403
Odessa, TX 90,943
Fall River, MA 91,938
New Bedford, MA 93,768
Albany, NY 95,658
Macon, GA 97,255
Source: Analysis by Hal Wolman, Kimberly Furdell, and Pamela Blumenthal, The George Washington University
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What are the economic characteristics of
older industrial cities?
While index scores allow cities to be ranked on a 
collective grouping of indicators, they don’t tell us
anything about how they perform on individual meas-
ures of economic health. As indicated by the very
method used to determine which of the 302 cities
were the “weakest” economically, the 65 older indus-
trial cities do worse than their peers on all indicators
in the two indexes.
Taken together, the set of 65 cities was character-
ized by slow—or negative—economic growth from
1990 to 2000. On average, these cities lost 8 percent
of their jobs, while employment actually grew by 
18 percent in the remaining cities in the dataset.
Older industrial cities saw their real average payroll
increase by only 14 percent and the number of estab-
lishments grow by just over 1 percent, compared to
45 percent and 18 percent, respectively, among the
other cities.
Older industrial cities’ performance on measures 
of residential economic well-being looks much the
same. In 2000, the average per capita income in
these 65 cities was 78 percent of the average for the
Why “older industrial cities?” 
While as a group these 65 cities are lagging behind other U.S.cities on a range of economic measures, a closer examina-
tion reveals that they are not a monolithic bunch: Some are relatively
“weaker” on employment and establishment growth, for example,
while others rank at the bottom based on their residents’ income and
poverty levels. Still others fall somewhere in the middle of the 65 on
both sets of indicators.
More important than their differences, however, are the features
that unify them.
The most obvious of these commonalities is geographic.While
scattered throughout the Southeast,Texas, and California, these
“weak” cities are disproportionately concentrated in the Northeast
and Midwest: Over two-thirds (44) are located in just 14 “Rust Belt”
states, despite the fact that cities in these states make up only 29 per-
cent of the 302 cities in the dataset.6 Pennsylvania has the highest
proportion of its cities designated as “weak” (nine of the 10 in the 
dataset), followed by New York (seven of eight) and Ohio (eight 
of 11).7
The geographic clustering of these cities isn’t just about dots on a
map, however. Located in America’s “Rust Belt,” they share an eco-
nomic history dominated by heavy manufacturing: In 1970, the share
of city residents employed in manufacturing was at least 20 percent in
all but three of these 44 cities: Albany, NY; Harrisburg, PA; and
Pittsburgh, PA (Albany and Harrisburg are state capitals; Pittsburgh
was just under at 19.5 percent).This industrial heritage is shared,
moreover, by several additional “weak” cities located in the South 
and West.8
As described in some detail in the following section of this report,
these cities’ economic past has had a profound impact on their 
economic present. It is for this reason that “older industrial cities” is 
a fitting (if not perfectly inclusive) name for this group of 65—and 
will therefore be the moniker used in this report.9
Data for some indicators are not available beyond
2000. As such, the data utilized to create the two
indexes are from 1990 and 2000 (condition indicators
are based on year 2000 data while change indicators
reflect change from 1990 through 2000). However, a
look at several of the individual measures used to
identify the 65 older industrial cities indicates that
trends have remained consistent.According to avail-
able American Community Survey (ACS) data, for
example, the average poverty rate for 49 of the 65
older industrial cities was nearly 26 percent in 2005,
an increase of almost 3 percentage points since 2000.
The growth of wages and in the number of establish-
ments in these cities’ core counties, meanwhile, has
continued to lag that of their peers. County Business
Patterns data reveal that from 2000 to 2004 real
annual payroll in the 65 older industrial core counties
declined by approximately 1 percent, while it grew
nearly 4 percent in the other dataset counties.The
number of establishments in older industrial counties,
meanwhile, increased by less than 1 percent during
this period, compared to nearly 5 percent in the
other counties.
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other 237 cities ($16,019 compared to $20,424) 
in 2000, and their average median household 
income was 76 percent of the average for the other
cities ($29,138 compared to $38,510). Older indus-
trial cities had an average unemployment rate of 
10 percent and a labor force participation rate of 
59 percent, compared to an average 6.5 percent
unemployment and 65.5 percent labor force partici-
pation in the other cities. And the average poverty
rate in older industrial cities was 23 percent, com-
pared to an average of just 15 percent in the others.
How have older industrial cities 
performed over time?
The performance of older industrial cities over the
past few decades has not been static, with some cities
showing sharp improvements relative to other U.S.
cities, many showing disappointing declines, and still
others falling somewhere in the middle. 
To assess how the 302 cities compared with one
another in terms of their economic performance from
one decade to the next, we again looked at two sets
of indicators. The City Economic Performance Index
measures the change in the growth rate of employ-
ment, of annual payroll, and of the number of estab-
lishments over the period from 1980 to 1990, to that
from 1990 to 2000. The Residential Economic Well-
Being Performance index reflects change in per
capita income, median household income, poverty
rate, unemployment rate, and labor force participa-
tion rate from 1990 to 2000. As above, cities were
ranked on each index and divided into strong, moder-
ate, and weak groupings.
Of the 65 older industrial cities, nine actually saw
strong improvement on both sets of indicators, mean-
ing they were in the top third of all the sample cities
based on their gains across decades. This robust 
performance may help explain why Canton and
Mansfield, Ohio and Terre Haute, Indiana are, over-
all, among the least economically distressed of the
older industrial cities. It also demonstrates that while
the well-being of residents of Cleveland, Detroit,
Saginaw, and Youngstown is still among the worst of
all cities, these residents are, on average, relatively
better off than they were a decade ago. New Orleans
and Shreveport, in Louisiana, also fit into this group
of “strong performers.” 
Unfortunately, a far larger number of older indus-
Older industrial cities are lagging other U.S. cities on several indicators 
of economic health and well-being 
City Economic Condition Index (1990 to 2000) Older Industrial Cities Other 237 Cities
Change in Employment -8.3% 18.0%
Change in Annual Payroll 14.0% 45.1%*
Change in Establishments 1.4% 18.0%*
Residential Economic Well-Being Index (2000)
Median Household Income $29,138 $38,510 
Per Capita Income $16,019 $20,424 
Unemployment Rate 10.0% 6.5%
Poverty Rate 23.0% 15.2%
Labor Force Participation Rate 58.8% 65.5%
*Doesn’t include Carson City, NV (data not available)
Source: Analysis by Hal Wolman, Kimberly Furdell, and Pamela Blumenthal, The George Washington University
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Twenty-six cities were among the 65 
economically weakest cities in 2000,
but did not meet the criteria  in 1990
Albany, NY*
Allentown, PA
Birmingham, AL
Bridgeport, CT*
Decatur, IL
Fall River, MA
Fresno, CA*
Hartford, CT*
Lancaster, PA*
Long Beach, CA*
Los Angeles, CA*
Macon, GA*
Merced, CA*
Miami, FL*
New Bedford, MA
New Haven, CT*
Odessa, TX
Richmond, VA*
Rochester, NY*
Rocky Mount, NC*
San Bernardino, CA*
Santa Maria, CA*
Schenectady, NY
Stockton, CA*
Syracuse, NY*
Trenton, NJ*
*Indicates those cities that were weak on both the City
Economic Performance index and the Residential Economic
Well-Being Performance index.
Source: Analysis by Hal Wolman, Kimberly Furdell, and
Pamela Blumenthal, The George Washington University
The performance of older industrial
cities over the past few decades has not
been static, with some cities showing
sharp improvements relative to other
U.S. cities, many showing disappointing
declines, and still others falling 
somewhere in the middle.
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trial cities fared worse than their peers over the
period in question: Almost one-third (21) of the 65
cities are considered weak on both performance
indices, their economies deteriorating from one
decade to the next.10 Syracuse, NY, for example, expe-
rienced a 36 percent increase in establishments dur-
ing the 1980s, but an almost 7 percent loss in the
1990s. The city’s real payroll growth also weakened
substantially, increasing by 29 percent from 1980 to
1990 while not growing at all from 1990 to 2000. Its
poverty rate rose from 23 percent in 1990 to 27 per-
cent in 2000, and real median household income
declined by nearly 11 percent. Likewise, Hartford,
CT saw its number of establishments grow by 33 per-
cent from 1980 to 1990, and then decrease by almost
4 percent during the 1990s. Its real median house-
hold income, moreover, dropped
by 15 percent during the 1990s,
while its poverty rate jumped
from 27.5 percent to nearly 31
percent. 
The story was much the same
in the other “weak perform-
ance” cities. In fact, 19 of these
21 cities—including Syracuse
and Hartford—were not even
among the weakest cities in
1990, but were on the list of 65 in 2000 as a result
of a performance on measures of economic condition
and residential well-being that slipped behind that 
of their peers (The other two—Binghamton, NY and
Springfield, MA—were “weak” in both 1990 and
2000).
What is the relationship of older 
industrial cities to their regions?
The “city,” of course, is a political—not an economic
—construct. While cities are vital entities in and of
themselves—as places where policies are created 
and implemented, taxes are levied, and services are
provided—markets don’t adhere to the arbitrary
boundaries that separate them from their surrounding
jurisdictions. Cities are simply sub-units of the larger
economic region. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
labor market areas, for example, are closely aligned
with metropolitan areas—themselves determined in
large part by commuter sheds—with no distinction
between city and suburb. And housing markets—at
least for those who have the ability to choose where
they live—follow the geography of employment. 
A look at the economic condition of the 302 sam-
ple cities’ metropolitan areas demonstrates the rela-
tionship between cities and their surrounding
regions. By dividing the sample cities’ metros into
“weak,” “moderate,” and “strong” groups based on
While cities are vital entities in and of themselves—as
places where policies are created and implemented, taxes
are levied, and services are provided—markets don’t
adhere to the arbitrary boundaries that separate them
and their surrounding jurisdictions.
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The vast majority of older industrial cities are located in economically struggling metropolitan areas
Weak City,Weak MSA Weak City, Moderate MSA
City MSA/PMSA City MSA/PMSA 
Albany, GA Albany, GA Allentown, PA Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ
Albany, NY Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY Cincinnati, OH Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN
Altoona, PA Altoona, PA Detroit, MI Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI
Baltimore, MD Baltimore-Towson, MD Fresno, CA Fresno, CA
Beaumont, TX Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX Hartford, CT Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
Binghamton, NY Binghamton, NY Jackson, MS Jackson, MS
Birmingham, AL Birmingham-Hoover, AL Kalamazoo, MI Kalamazoo-Portage, MI
Buffalo, NY Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Lancaster, PA Lancaster, PA
Canton, OH Canton-Massillon, OH Macon, GA Macon, GA
Cleveland, OH Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH Miami, FL Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL
Dayton, OH Dayton, OH New Haven, CT New Haven-Milford, CT
Decatur, IL Decatur, IL Newark, NJ New York-Northern NJ-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
Erie, PA Erie, PA Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
Fall River, MA Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA Santa Maria, CA Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA
Flint, MI Flint, MI Stockton, CA Stockton, CA
Harrisburg, PA Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA
Huntington, WV Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH
Long Beach, CA Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
Mansfield, OH Mansfield, OH
Merced, CA Merced, CA
Milwaukee, WI Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI
Muncie, IN Muncie, IN
New Bedford, MA Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA
New Orleans, LA New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA
Odessa, TX Odessa, TX
Pine Bluff, AR Pine Bluff, AR
Pittsburgh, PA Pittsburgh, PA
Port Arthur, TX Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX
Providence, RI Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA
Reading, PA Reading, PA
Rochester, NY Rochester, NY
Rocky Mount, NC Rocky Mount, NC
Saginaw, MI Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI
Schenectady, NY Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
Scranton, PA Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA
Shreveport, LA Shreveport-Bossier City, LA
Springfield, MA Springfield, MA
Springfield, OH Springfield, OH
St. Louis, MO St. Louis, MO-IL
Syracuse, NY Syracuse, NY
Terre Haute, IN Terre Haute, IN
Trenton, NJ Trenton-Ewing, NJ
Utica, NY Utica-Rome, NY
Warren, OH Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA
Youngstown, OH Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA
Source: Analysis by Hal Wolman, Kimberly Furdell, and Pamela Blumenthal, The George Washington University
their rank on a MSA Economic Condition index—
which in this case included the change in MSA-level
employment, wages, and gross metropolitan product
from 1990 to 2000, and the gross metropolitan prod-
uct per job in 2000—the strong link between the
economic health of cities and that of their metropol-
itan areas becomes evident. Only three older indus-
trial cities were in MSAs that had strong scores on
the MSA Economic Condition index: Bridgeport,
CT; Richmond, VA; and San Bernardino, CA. Fifteen
were in MSAs with moderate index scores, while the
vast majority—46 cities—were in MSAs with weak
MSA Economic Condition index scores.11 Conversely,
of the 57 “strong” cities, 42 were located in strong
metropolitan areas. Thirteen of these cities were
located in moderate regions, and only two—
Huntsville, AL and Bismarck, ND—were located in
weak regions.
As these numbers show, economic decline and
decay in nearly three-quarters of the country’s weak-
est cities is not confined within their borders. To put
this in sharper perspective, this means that, as of
2000, almost 2.3 million residents of Massachusetts,
over 4.2 million residents of New York, and nearly 
4.3 million residents of Pennsylvania and Ohio 
(comprising 36 percent, 22 percent, 35 percent, and
38 percent of their state populations, respectively)
were living in economically anemic regions—a fact
that should surely alarm state leaders concerned
about their long-term competitiveness. At the same
time, though, this city-MSA analysis also suggests a
potential bright spot for the smaller number of cities
in comparatively healthy regions, as they may be able
to capitalize on positive economic growth trends. In
any case, the relationship between metros and the
cities within them is very real—if perhaps not fully
understood—and thus demands the attention of all
who have a stake in their mutual prosperity. ■
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Weak City, Strong MSA
City MSA/PMSA 
Bridgeport, CT Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT
Richmond, VA Richmond, VA
San Bernardino, CA Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
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III. The Origins and
Challenges of Older
Industrial Cities
O
lder industrial cities weren’t always in such troubled eco-
nomic circumstances.These communities were once thriv-
ing centers of business and commerce.They were the
economic, political, and cultural hubs of their respective
regions, and the font of the nation’s growth and prosper-
ity. While certainly not without their troubles—corruption, racial strife, extreme
poverty, and unhealthful environmental conditions among them—their relevance and
function in the economy were understood and unquestioned.
But over the past five decades, globaliza-
tion and rapid technological change
have created a new economic para-
digm in which the role of many central
cities has become uncertain at best and
at worst, downright precarious. The
seeming inability of the most distressed
of the nation’s cities to adapt to new eco-
nomic realities can largely be explained by a series of
interrelated economic, demographic, and political
forces—and choices—that together have trapped
them in a self-reinforcing cycle of decline, including:
• the shift from a manufacturing economy to a
knowledge-based one that has left many older
industrial cities still grappling to find
their economic niche; 
• extreme economic and residential
decentralization that has left the
poor and minorities isolated in the
urban core, spatially “cut off” from
education and employment oppor-
tunities;
• 60-plus years of federal, state, and local policies
that have largely stacked the deck against cities,
undermining their ability to attract and retain
businesses and residents.
To be sure, these trends have affected different
cities to varying degrees and in myriad ways. But as a
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group they help explain how America’s economically
struggling cities got to this point, and provide insight
into what steps can ensure that the next half century
is kinder to these communities than the last. 
Deindustrialization has left
older industrial cities struggling
to find their economic niche 
From the mid-19th century until the mid-20th, the
industrial revolution transformed America from an
agricultural to a manufacturing economy. During
this period, access to raw materials, dense trans-
portation networks, and proximity to markets became
clear competitive advantages for producing goods for
local and national needs, allowing cities—particu-
larly those in the Northeast and Midwest—to grow
and flourish as the new centers of the country’s eco-
nomic activity. 
By the middle part of the 20th century, however,
changes in the global economy, coupled with techno-
logical advances and geopolitical shifts, began to
diminish the importance of the spatial attributes
upon which America’s great industrial towns were
built. These trends were manifested in two major
ways. First, other—cheaper—places to set up and
maintain shop emerged, enabling the inexorable
movement of manufacturing firms from cities to sub-
urbs, from the North to the South, and from the U.S.
to countries abroad. This physical redistribution of
manufacturing was later coupled with advances in
automation that sparked increases in productivity and
a reduction in companies’ overall employment needs.
Together, this “double whammy” rocked the
economies of what were once the nation’s industrial
powerhouses, leaving them still struggling to adapt to
a very new competitive landscape. 
The first signs of industrial decline in America’s
older industrial cities began in the years following
WWII. The pace of change was slow, however, and
even by 1970 most of these communities were still
heavily reliant on the sector: On average, nearly 
27 percent of older industrial city residents were
employed in manufacturing then, compared to just
17 percent in the other 237 cities in the analysis. 
All 20 of the older industrial cities with the highest
shares of residents employed in the sector were
located in what is today’s Rust Belt—with cities like
Warren, OH (46.7 percent), Flint, MI (43.8 per-
cent), and New Bedford, MA (43.2 percent) topping
the list.12
But over the next three decades, the pattern of
industrial growth and decline would cause the respec-
tive shares of manufacturing jobs in older industrial
cities and the other dataset cities to converge. 
The 1970s dealt a swift economic blow to many
cities in the nation’s industrial heartland. From 1970
to 1980, the number of older industrial city residents
with jobs in manufacturing fell by an average of 
2 percent, while the number of residents of the other
dataset cities who were employed in the sector
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jumped by nearly 53 percent. These trends mask pre-
cipitous declines in many communities, however:
Dayton, OH, for example, lost almost 46 percent of
its manufacturing jobs over the decade, and Detroit
lost almost 40 percent. Only 17 of the 65 older
industrial cities—all but three of which are located in
the South and West—saw increases in manufacturing
during the decade; conversely, only 47 of the 237
other cities saw decreases.13
Still, for many cities, the worst was yet to come.
From 1980 to 1990, the average number of older
industrial city residents employed in manufacturing
decreased by over 23 percent, before dropping
another 20 percent during the 1990s. Meanwhile,
the average number of residents of the other dataset
cities who were working in the sector continued to
grow, rising by over 10 percent in the 1980s, and
another 6 percent the following decade.14
All told, from 1970 to 2000 the number of older
industrial city residents employed in manufacturing
fell by an average of nearly 33 percent, while the
number of residents in the other cities who held jobs
in the sector swelled nearly 104 percent.15 And as the
number of older industrial city residents working in
manufacturing each day declined, so too did the over-
all share of residents employed in the sector. By
2000, the proportion of older industrial city residents
employed in manufacturing had dropped sharply to
just over 15 percent, while the share of residents in
the other 237 cities who were working in such jobs
had dipped just a few percentage points to 12 per-
cent.16
Clearly, the swift deterioration of manufacturing
has seriously damaged the cities where it was once
concentrated—evidenced by their overall employment
losses and slow income growth. The decline of manu-
facturing isn’t in and of itself the reason for older
industrial cities’ poor economic condition, however.
Rather, it is the long-term legacy costs of deindustri-
alization that continue to hamper their recovery. 
The first of these costs is the failure to replace the
large numbers of well-paying industrial jobs lost with
high-paying jobs in other, rapid growth sectors. These
communities simply haven’t seen the new business
formation that, as Douglas E. Booth notes, “is a nec-
essary precursor to a recovery in the rate of economic
growth in older regions of the country saddled with
slow growing or declining older industries.” Booth’s
research on industrial life-cycles in the Northeast and
Midwest demonstrates that a dominance of older
established industries can actually thwart entrepre-
neurialism and new business creation, and that
employment destruction in old industries can over-
power employment creation in new industries for a
very long period of time.17
Today’s more successful cities are by and large
Older industrial cities shed manufacturing jobs over the past several decades, while other cities gained
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
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Other 237 Cities
Older Industrial Cities
1970–20001990–20001980–19901970–1980
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, State of the Cities Data Systems
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those that were either not so
heavily dominated by manufac-
turing in the first place, or
those that were better able to
navigate the transition from a
manufacturing-based economy
to one that is more diverse.
Indeed, analysis of the 302
sample cities revealed that a city’s economic diversity
in 1990 was in fact positively related to city employ-
ment over the course of the next decade. While man-
ufacturing is still important to the economies of
many healthy cities, they are also home to a substan-
tial and growing number of advanced services indus-
tries, becoming specialized locations for corporate
headquarters; finance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE) firms; and producer services such as law and
advertising.18
Lower educational levels are a second legacy cost
of older industrial cities’ historical reliance on heavy
manufacturing: While the number of college gradu-
ates in these cities is rising, in 2000, less than 17
percent of older industrial city residents had a bache-
lor’s degree, compared to nearly 27 percent in the
other 237 cities. These numbers represent a lingering
vestige from a time when a high school education
was all that was needed to attain the vast majority of
good jobs. Today that is no longer the case, as jobs in
most high paying occupations demand a higher
degree. In 2005, over 95 percent of medical and bio-
logical scientists had a college education, for exam-
ple, as did at least three-quarters of those in the legal
field, and 65 percent of computer and mathematics
specialists.19 Not surprisingly, then, the lack of educa-
tion among older industrial city residents is hamper-
ing these communities’ ability to grow new jobs:
Analysis of the 302 cities revealed that even a one
percentage point increase in the percentage of the
city population with at least some college in 1990
was associated with a 0.41 percentage point increase
in employment growth over the next 10 years.
Lagging educational levels are surely also contribut-
ing to older industrial cities’ lower income levels:
According to a recent report by the Institute for
Higher Education Policy, in 2004 the average total
personal income of workers nationwide with only a
high school diploma was $25,053, over $23,000 less
than those with a bachelor’s degree.20
Finally, deindustrialization has left a tremendous
environmental legacy, manifested in the large num-
bers of contaminated parcels that scar older indus-
trial cities’ waterfronts and urban cores. No one
knows for sure how many brownfields there are, what
percentage are rural or urban, or what their total eco-
nomic impact may be. The U.S. Government
Accounting Office (GAO), however, estimates that
there are as many as 425,000 brownfields throughout
the country, and some estimates show that there are
5 million acres of abandoned industrial sites in cities
alone—roughly the same amount of land occupied by
60 of the country’s largest cities.21 In any case, a ride
through any older industrial city reveals the trap of
deterioration these sites are caught in, as they con-
tinue to be stigmatized by significant regulatory and
financial constraints to redevelopment. This, in turn,
has a ripple effect on proximate sites, suppressing
values, discouraging investment, and devaluing cities’
shorelines and historic neighborhoods—the very
assets on which their future growth depends. 
The impact of economic
change has been exacerbated
by unbalanced demographic and
development patterns, creating
a vicious cycle of decline
In the heyday of the Rust Belt’s manufacturing hege-
mony, its cities were at once busy and vibrant,
crowded and unhealthy. 
As regional centers of both employment and popu-
The decline of manufacturing isn’t in and of itself the
reason for older industrial cities’ poor economic condi-
tion. Rather, it is the long-term legacy costs of deindus-
trialization that continue to hamper their recovery.
lation, they had dense, glistening downtowns, and
stable neighborhoods where people raised their chil-
dren, and minded their grandchildren, on the same
streets where they grew up. 
But for many, living conditions were grim.
Overcrowded, noisy, and polluted by factories, this
less-than-idyllic quality of life spurred the first major
exodus from the core and the concomitant creation
of the nation’s first modern suburbs. This move out-
ward—predominantly by the wealthy—began as early
as the late 19th century, enabled first by rail, then by
streetcar, and within a few decades, accelerated sub-
stantially by the increasingly ubiquitous automobile.22
While in the early part of the 20th century city popu-
lation growth still outpaced that of the suburbs, by
the 1920s, the median difference between the two
fell to nearly zero; by the 1930s, suburban growth
rates exceeded city rates by approximately 7 percent.23
Over the next several decades, new highways and
cheap mortgages lured millions more upper- and mid-
dle-class Americans to the ever-expanding urban
fringe. Even as the decline in central-city manufac-
turing was making some cities quieter, cleaner, and
generally more pleasant places to live, the diaspora
continued, fueled now by a heightened need for
housing, and growing discrimination against the
“Great Migration” of black workers moving into these
cities from the rural south. In the years following
WWII, the “pull” of plentiful new suburban homes
was coupled with a racially motivated “push” of
white-middle class families from the increasingly
black urban core such that by the 1950s, the 
median suburban population growth rate exceeded
the city rate by 30 percentage points.24 Such growth
patterns—both a cause and effect of large numbers
of black in-migrants moving into formerly all-white
city neighborhoods—led to rising levels of what was
already entrenched urban black-white segregation,
particularly in the large industrial areas of the
Northeast and Midwest.25 The race riots of the late
1960s occurred just as segregation in American met-
ros was approaching its zenith, providing stark evi-
dence of just how wide the racial divide had
become.26
Decades of middle-class flight and a declining
industrial base had, by 1970,
left many American cities not
only hyper-segregated, but
increasingly poor, and fiscally
strapped. Meanwhile, the com-
paratively high-income suburbs
were providing better services at
a lower cost to their residents.
The implications of these city-
suburb disparities were underscored by William Frey
in a 1979 American Sociological Review article. In
examining city-suburban migration patterns from
1965 to 1970, Frey found that, while racial factors
still played a role in the increasing movement of
whites out of cities, this trend was now primarily a
result of various dimensions of central city decline,
including city-suburb fiscal disparities, particularly
relative tax levels, and the suburbanization of employ-
ment. He noted:
“City residents…are being asked to pay higher
taxes…than are their contemporaries in the suburbs.
In return, they are not likely to receive proportion-
ally better services and, in fact, can be virtually
assured of lower quality schools and higher rates 
of crime…It is likely, therefore, that the increased
out-of-pocket costs and deteriorating environmental
conditions associated with residence in financially
plagued cities will provide additional impetus for
suburbanward movement.”27
And so began the vicious cycle of city population
loss and urban decline, a downward spiral that was
perpetuated over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 
To the extent that popular culture reflects, and in
turn influences reality, these were truly dark days for
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In the years following WWII, the “pull” of plentiful new 
suburban homes was coupled with a racially motivated “push”
of white-middle class families from the increasingly black urban
core such that by the 1950s, the median suburban population
growth rate exceeded the city rate by 30 percentage points.
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the nation’s cities. In movies, newspapers, and on TV,
images of long unemployment lines and crowded
soup kitchens in the 1970s were followed in the
1980s by depictions of the ravages of AIDS, crime,
and crack, making cities seem desolate, run down,
and scary, and generally not places in which people
with options would choose to spend time. 
City populations—particularly in the nation’s most
struggling communities—plummeted during this
period, while poverty climbed. From 1970 to 1990,
the 65 older industrial communities lost an average
of 2 percent of their residents, with cities like St.
Louis (-36.2 percent), Cleveland (-32.7 percent),
and Detroit (-32.0 percent) each bleeding, on net,
approximately a third of their total population. Cities
in the Northeast and Midwest were hit the hardest;
in fact, only one of the 16 older industrial cities
whose populations grew during this period—Muncie,
IN—was located outside of the West and South.
Even older northern cities like Chicago (-17.2 per-
cent), Boston (-10.4 percent), and New York 
(-7.3 percent)—which weren’t among the 65 weakest
cities by 2000—saw substantial declines, despite the
fact that, on the whole, the other 237 cities in the
dataset grew a booming 53 percent. Meanwhile,
poverty rates in older industrial cities skyrocketed,
reaching 18 percent in 1980 and 22 percent by
1990, compared to 14 percent and 16 percent,
respectively, in the other dataset cities, and 12 per-
cent and 13 percent nationally.28
By the early 1990s, the worst appeared to be over
for many U.S. cities, and the tide began to turn. The
crack epidemic had started to recede, overall crime
rates were falling, populations increased, and cities
became the media’s new darling, with hip, young
urbanites the new faces of the American sitcom.
Urban real estate markets, moreover, started to 
soar, with increasing numbers of young people,
empty-nesters, and others choosing city life over 
the suburbs. From 1990 to 2000, the population of
cities like Austin (up 41 percent) and Phoenix (up
34.3 percent), for example, continued to boom; even
New York (up 9.4 percent) and Chicago (up 4 per-
cent)—poster children for urban decay in years 
previous—saw a reversal of demographic fortunes
over the decade.29
Unfortunately, older industrial cities did not partici-
pate in the resurgence.
While both domestic and foreign migration during
the 1990s contributed to the rise of American city
populations writ large, older industrial cities contin-
ued to struggle to attract and retain residents. These
Older industrial cities are behind their peers on a number of measures of city vitality 
and social well-being
Older Industrial Cities Other 237 Cities
City Vitality Indicators
Change in population* 2.6% 18.1%
Residential vacancy rate 9.9% 6.0%
Median home value $80,617 $122,390 
Homeownership rate 49.3% 55.7%
Social Well-Being Indicators
Percent of residents without a high school degree 26.9% 17.3%
Percent of residents with college degree 16.7% 26.6%
Percent single parent families 45.1% 31.3%
Murder rate per 10,000 population 1.49 0.64
*1990 to 2000; all other numbers are for 2000
Source: Analysis by Hal Wolman, Kimberly Furdell, and Pamela Blumenthal, The George Washington University
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cities lost, on average, nearly 3 percent of their resi-
dents from 1990 to 2000, while the other cities in
the dataset grew by a robust 18 percent. At the same
time, their share of metropolitan population—already
substantially lower than that of the other cities—
declined more rapidly, demonstrating the substantial
decentralization occurring in their regions: The 
proportion of metropolitan residents living in older
industrial cities fell from 28 percent in 1990 to
just 26 percent in 2000 while the proportion of
metro residents living in the other 237 cities fell 
from 37 percent to 36 percent.30
As the population of the 65 older industrial cities
decreased, their neediest residents remained concen-
trated in the core. By 2000, nearly a quarter of these
cities’ poor were living in neighborhoods where the
poverty rate exceeded 40 percent, compared to just 
12 percent of the poor living in the other 237 com-
munities. Older industrial cities were also more segre-
gated: In 2000, nearly 54 percent of blacks living in
these cities would have needed to move in order to 
be evenly distributed within the city, compared to 
just 42 percent of blacks living in the other dataset
cities.31
The economic impact of these patterns is twofold. 
In the first place, they have a terrible effect on the
families left behind in deteriorating neighborhoods
with limited access to employment opportunities and
good schools. Research by Raphael and Stoll has
demonstrated, for example, that blacks residing in
metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest are,
in fact, more physically isolated from employment
opportunities than those in other regions.32 Further,
poor and minority residents aren’t getting the educa-
tion they need to compete for quality jobs. While cer-
tainly not unique to the nation’s most distressed cities,
some of the worst performing schools are, in fact,
located in these communities. In 2004, seven of the
10 large urban school districts with the widest per-
centage point gap between their 7th and 8th grade
reading and math test scores and that of their respec-
tive states were older industrial cities—including
Rochester, NY (-34.8 percent); Milwaukee (-33 per-
cent); Detroit (-31.1 percent); Newark (-28.9 per-
cent); Philadelphia (-27.4 percent); Providence 
(-25 percent); and New Orleans (-24.5 percent)—
while none of those with the smallest gaps were in
older industrial communities.33 Further, six of the 10
large urban districts with the lowest graduation rates
were in older industrial cities: Detroit (21.7 percent);
Baltimore (38.5 percent); Milwaukee (43.1 percent);
Cleveland (43.8 percent); Los Angeles (44.2 percent);
and Miami-Dade (45.3 percent).34 All told, in 2000,
27 percent of older industrial city residents didn’t
complete high school, compared to just 17 percent in
the other 237 cities.35
Second, these disparities undermine older indus-
trial cities’ economic prosperity and perpetuate the
cycle of economic isolation. Most obviously, high
concentrations of poverty mean a lower tax base,
higher crime rates, and a concomitant demand for
greater social services, undercutting cities’ overall fis-
cal health and amplifying the city-suburban gaps Frey
wrote about in the late 1970s.36 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, however, such conditions undermine cities’
ability to cultivate a skilled workforce, and frustrate
their efforts to grow and attract the firms so essential
to building and sustaining a strong economy. 
Federal, state, and local policies
and practices have generally
been unfavorable to cities,
compounding their troubles
While both broad economic trends and the locational
preferences of individuals and families have been the
primary forces behind urban decline, public policy
and practice—at all levels—have over time in many
ways exacerbated the problem. Through their huge
investments in infrastructure, economic development,
social programs, and education, as well as through
outmoded and/or cumbersome laws and regulations,
federal, state, and local governments have—often
unwittingly, sometimes not—facilitated the migration
of people and jobs (and the tax base they provide)
toward an expanding metropolitan fringe, while rein-
forcing the concentration of poverty and the deterio-
ration of older established areas. 
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The Role of State Policy
States, particularly, have a significant role in shaping
the form and function of localities, a role that has
expanded in recent years as the federal government
continues to devolve more powers to state govern-
ments. This role is played out in a number of ways: 
• In the first place, states set the geography of gov-
ernance. They decide the structure of local gover-
nance and then decide whether the boundaries of
local governments are fixed or subject to change
through annexation—whether they are, in the
words of David Rusk, “little box” or “big box.”37
• States establish the fiscal playing field for
municipalities and school districts. They decide
the form of taxes that municipalities can impose
on residents and businesses and through general
or specific tax sharing efforts determine the
extent to which the playing field between rich and
poor jurisdictions is level.
• States help determine where, and in what man-
ner, regional development takes place. They
invest significant resources in economic develop-
ment, physical infrastructure, public parks, and
other capital improvements, influencing where
projects get built throughout a metropolitan area.
They also determine the codes and standards of
building construction, establish how and when
cities can foreclose on tax delinquent properties,
and dictate the ground rules for when they can
employ eminent domain.
• States help shape the quality of regional eco-
nomic growth. Through their investments in
higher education, workforce programs, and eco-
nomic development, they can decide to nurture
the development of higher-wage industries such
as health care, corporate research, and advanced
producer services, or instead default to an “any
job is a good job” method of business and employ-
ment attraction.
• States create the opportunity structure for low-
and middle-income residents. They administer
federal and state workforce development, health-
care, housing, and myriad other social welfare
grants and programs that impact families’ ability
to improve their incomes and build wealth. 
For all this, over the past several decades state poli-
cies and practices toward cities and older areas have
not been oriented toward market creation and revital-
ization. At best, these communities have been treated
with benign neglect, with state programs and invest-
ments focused more on managing their decline than
on restoring and sustaining their economic and fiscal
health. At worst, state policies and investments have
actually worked against them, encouraging growth in
newer communities at the expense of cities and their
residents. Below are just a few examples of how this
occurs. 
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State Governance and Fiscal Policies
Cities and other municipalities are creations of state
laws that establish the governance and fiscal struc-
tures under which they must operate. Often on the
books since a state’s early days, these structures are
largely out of synch with the realities and practicali-
ties of how economies today are organized, goods and
services are provided, and land use decisions ought to
be made. 
First, state governments determine the organization
of local jurisdictions that lie within their borders, as
well as the number and boundaries of school districts
and special purpose governments. In states through-
out the Northeast and Midwest, these systems are
often highly fragmented, resulting in a complicated,
inefficient, and overlapping labyrinth of governmental
control. Throughout older industrial states such as
Pennsylvania (2,633 general governments), Ohio
(2,338 general governments), Michigan (1,858 gen-
eral governments), and New York (1,602 general gov-
ernments) an enormous number of artificial
municipal boundaries require what are otherwise
interrelated communities to provide their own set of
largely duplicative services to their residents, and at
the same time force them to compete for revenue-
generating development.38 And it is the central cities
that usually lose out: Businesses and residents can
locate within a few miles of the core, pay fewer taxes,
receive better services, and enjoy all the amenities
and benefits the city has to offer, giving them little
incentive to actually locate there. 
These problems are made worse by state policies
that establish the fiscal structures under which
municipalities and school districts must operate.
States decide the form of taxes that municipalities
can impose on residents and businesses, including
property taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, and fees,
and determine the state-local formula for how
schools are financed. They also, significantly, deter-
mine if and how general or specific tax-sharing
efforts can take place between jurisdictions—a partic-
ularly salient issue in highly fragmented states. State-
imposed tax systems are often not universally
appropriate for all localities, however, many of which
might benefit from more flexibility in their revenue-
raising options, and/or from a greater ability to share
revenues with wealthier communities who may use
city services and facilities without paying the costs.39
Together, these governance and fiscal structures
place a particularly severe strain on older industrial
cities, which have high levels of poverty, high crime
rates, aging infrastructure, large
employee compensation liabili-
ties, and a whole host of other
cost burdens that far exceed
newer suburban jurisdictions at
the same time that low
incomes, high unemployment
rates, depressed home values,
large numbers of tax-exempt
properties, and shrinking employment leave them
with a smaller relative tax base. States, meanwhile,
aren’t picking up the slack to compensate: While all
state governments distribute some of their resources
to local governments to help pay for local public serv-
ices—particularly public education—such “spreading
of the wealth” is far less frequent when it comes to
financing basic services.40 The upshot is that fiscally
distressed cities become mired in a constant struggle
to provide good schools, adequate infrastructure, and
quality services without overburdening their tax-pay-
ing residents and businesses—a stressful conundrum
that’s nearly impossible for them to overcome. 
State Infrastructure and Development Policy
Older industrial cities have also often been on the
losing end of state transportation, housing, and rede-
velopment policies and investments.
To begin with, state transportation policies have a
significant impact on regional development. The set
of transportation challenges is daunting, with crum-
While all state governments distribute some of their
resources to local governments to help pay for local 
public services—particularly public education—
such “spreading of the wealth” is far less frequent 
when it comes to financing basic services.
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bling infrastructure, deteriorating air quality, long
commute times, and increased congestion threaten-
ing metropolitan competitiveness. Yet while local gov-
ernments own, and have responsibility for, most of
the nation’s transportation network—including 3 mil-
lion of its 4 million road miles, over half of its
bridges, and about 90 percent of its transit systems—
state Departments of Transportation still retain
authority over the vast majority of the federal and
state transportation funds needed to upgrade and
maintain it. And when it comes to the distribution of
these dollars, older urban communities often get
shortchanged.41
Take as just one example the distribution of state
gas taxes. Thirty states maintain either constitutional
or statutory laws that dedicate all gas tax receipts to
roadway development, administration, and mainte-
nance—therefore excluding the use of these funds
for mass transit. To make matters worse, these high-
way funds are then administered such that cities and
inner suburbs are often forced to contribute more in
tax receipts than they receive in state allocations,
despite the fact that they generally have greater
investment needs. This occurs for two reasons. First,
in most states cities and older suburban areas must
pay for improvements with municipal taxes, while
unincorporated outer areas are built and maintained
from state and county resources. Second, the formula
for distributing gas tax revenues is often skewed, with
some states distributing a portion of their funds
evenly among their counties regardless of their size 
or demonstrated need.42 Research on transportation
spending in Ohio—home of eight older industrial
cities—demonstrates this anti-urban bias. A study 
of expenditures in Ohio found that, from 1980 to
1998, the state’s rural counties received significantly
more funding to expand, maintain, and rehabilitate
highways than urban (and suburban) counties, even
though their highway needs and automobile use 
were less.43
A similarly tilted pattern can be seen in state hous-
ing policies that cluster affordable housing in the
urban core, concentrating poverty and widening the
distance between low-income residents and suburban
job growth centers. Recent research by Columbia
University’s Lance Freeman, for example, shows that,
during the 1990s, state housing agencies distributed
the majority of their federally-allocated low income
housing tax credits (LIHTC) to inner-city projects.
This practice was more acute in the Rust Belt: Nearly
68 percent of LIHTC units built in the Northeast,
and 61 percent of those built in the Midwest, were
located in central cities, compared to just 54 percent
of those built in both the South and West. The urban
neighborhoods where LIHTC units were constructed,
meanwhile, had higher poverty, lower median
incomes, and lower home values than those built in
suburban communities. While these gaps decreased
over the course of the decade, they still reflect the
extent to which low-income housing continues to be
concentrated in already disadvantaged metropolitan
neighborhoods.44
Various other state laws and economic development
programs have a substantial effect on metropolitan
development patterns, and have often served to perpet-
uate decline and disinvestment in older communities. 
First, a host of laws and regulations act to discour-
age—or at the very least haven’t encouraged—the
return of the private real estate market in cities,
undermining their ability to promptly put contami-
nated and/or underutilized properties back into play.
While nearly all states have voluntary brownfields
clean up programs, for example, not one has a system
by which to continually track their total number of
brownfields or other vacant properties, and, given the
magnitude of the problem in many regions and the
complexity involved in remediation, few provide ade-
quate resources for their redevelopment. 
At the same time, state tax foreclosure laws are
often so complex and cumbersome that chronically
tax delinquent—in many cases abandoned—proper-
ties can remain dilapidated blights on their sur-
rounding neighborhoods for years, becoming both a
cause and effect of these cities’ depressed real estate
markets. (The median 2000 home value of the aver-
age older industrial city, for example, was only
$80,617, two-thirds that of the average of the other
237 cities in the dataset ($122,390)). Even other-
wise market-ready older structures often remain
undeveloped, their rehabilitation and reuse stifled by
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outmoded building codes designed for new, rather
than existing, structures.45 While uniformly applied
within states, these regulatory barriers create a par-
ticularly vexing challenge for older industrial cities,
where—unlike the nation’s more thriving urban and
suburban markets—hostile regulatory environments
for infill and rehabilitation are unmitigated by the
promise of hefty returns. 
The impact of these laws and regulations is made
worse by state investment practices that subsidize
suburban greenfield projects at the same or even
greater levels as projects in more established commu-
nities. For example, a recent analysis of almost 4,000
company-specific economic development incentives
granted by the state of Michigan between 2001 and
2004 reveals that they have largely been used to fos-
ter job creation and retention in more affluent areas,
while shortchanging core communities. With 18 per-
cent of the state’s working-age population and one-
fourth of its dislocated workers, the central cities in
the study received just 6 percent of business tax cred-
its, 8 percent of road improvement dollars, and 15
percent of job training matching funds. By contrast,
the states’ fast-growing, middle class places with
above-average tax bases were granted sometimes two
or three times more of every kind of subsidy.46 All
told, these figures help demonstrate how unfocused
investments can further enhance the allure of loca-
tions that already have a competitive edge. 
Workforce and Other Policies Affecting Low-
Income Families
States’ contribution to older industrial cities’ contin-
ued decline has, of course, also had considerable
bearing on the opportunities available to the low- and
moderate-income residents left behind in these com-
munities. Meanwhile, a host of other state programs
and policies have either not done enough to help—or
have actually thwarted—the ability of struggling fami-
lies to get ahead. 
State-administered workforce development systems
typify the problem. Traditionally highly fragmented
and parochial, these systems—while improving in
many states—have come under heavy criticism for
being ineffectual in meeting the basic needs of both
workers and employers. Most
employment training systems,
for example, have done a poor
job of engaging businesses and
educational institutions in
ongoing program design and
improvement. As a result, they
have tended to focus on basic
job placement and generalized
job training, rather than on job retention and long-
term advancement in careers where there is demon-
strated or expected regional job growth.47 This has
not only limited the ability of low-income and unem-
ployed workers to gain and retain good jobs, but,
over the long term, has also likely influenced eco-
nomic growth. Perhaps many Rust Belt states would
have been able to retain more manufacturing firms if
their workforce was better prepared to adapt to, and
help create, more highly skilled industrial jobs.
The inability of low- and moderate-income workers
to access quality jobs is further frustrated by state
economic development efforts that aren’t producing
these jobs in the first place. Recent analysis by Good
Jobs First (GJF), for example, reveals that states and
municipalities provide approximately $50 billion a
year in subsidies—in the form of tax credits, low
interest loans and guarantees, infrastructure aid,
grants, etc.—to private corporations. Yet much of this
money is going to businesses that either fail to create
promised jobs, create predominantly low-wage jobs,
Perhaps many Rust Belt states would have been able 
to retain more manufacturing firms if their workforce 
was better prepared to adapt to, and help create,
more highly skilled industrial jobs.
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and/or (as noted above) create most of their jobs in
outlying suburban communities—money that could
be used to support high road economic development
and higher-wage employment opportunities for work-
ers of varying skill levels.48
Most states, finally, are not doing enough to make
work pay for low-income earners. Research by the
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, for exam-
ple, finds that state and local tax systems on the
whole actually take a much greater share of income
from middle- and low-income families than from
wealthier residents. Among the top 10 states with the
most regressive tax systems are Pennsylvania and
Michigan, which in 2002 asked their poorest resi-
dents—those in the bottom 20 percent of the income
scale—to pay almost two-and-one-half times and
nearly double, respectively, as great a share of their
earnings in taxes as they asked the wealthy—those in
the top 1 percent—to pay.49 Meanwhile, 31 states,
including Connecticut, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
California, still don’t have state Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) programs, a relatively simple way to
ameliorate regressive tax systems, and ensure that
those who are getting paid low wages at least get to
keep more of what they earn.50
The list could go on, but the point is made. While
states can’t bear all the responsibility, certainly, for
the plight of low-income urban residents, they could
be utilizing their resources and policies in ways that
far better served their interests. 
Federal Policy 
While state policy has a considerable impact on the
well-being of cities and their residents, federal policy,
too, affects urban areas, in numerous ways. This rela-
tionship is complex. Major federal policies on tax,
trade, transportation, and immigration have a huge
influence on the vitality of city economies and the
shape of metropolitan growth. Federal policies on edu-
cation, job training, wages, financial services, health
care, and housing, meanwhile, have a profound effect
on the life opportunities of low- and moderate-income
city residents. Below are just a few examples of how
these policies have worked against urban areas.
Transportation and housing policies demonstrate
the clear federal policy bias towards suburban devel-
opment. For example, beginning with the construc-
tion of the interstate highway system, federal
transportation spending has facilitated outward
growth, and has continued to leave many older com-
munities without the resources needed to build and
maintain their aging roads and transit systems.51
According to research by Beimborn and Puentes,
transit funding is lower and less secure than for high-
ways, is subject to intense competition, and requires
a complex and convoluted process for project
approval. Such an uneven playing field clearly
inhibits cities’ ability to grow and sustain adequate
public transportation systems, while facilitating
growth on the fringe.52
Federal housing and homeownership policies also
tend not to be spatially neutral. 
The deductibility under state and federal
income taxes for mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes is a prime example. While agnostic
on their face—homeowners, after all, live in
all types of jurisdictions—in practice these
tax breaks disproportionately benefit subur-
banites. The very structure of the incentive
significantly benefits wealthier filers, most
of whom are obviously not living in the
nation’s distressed cities—in fact, in 2003
over 83 percent of the benefits of the deduc-
tion went to homeowners with incomes
above $40,000 a year.53 Homeownership
rates, moreover, are generally low in cities—
less than 50 percent of older industrial city
residents are homeowners, for example,
compared to nearly 70 percent nationwide—
and renters receive no benefit. For these
reasons, a 1997 study by Gyourko and Voith
estimated that as much as three-fourths of
the benefits of the mortgage interest and
property tax deductions accrue to suburban
property owners.54
While homeownership policies funnel
wealth to the suburbs, affordable housing policies
concentrate poverty in the cities. 
From the 1970s until the mid-1990s, federal public
housing policies almost exclusively catered to the
nation’s poorest residents, giving them first priority
over those with higher incomes; they also segregated
residents by race.55 As a result, publicly owned and/or
subsidized housing projects became—and in many
areas continue to be—repositories for poor and
minority residents. At the same time, subsidized
housing itself has been largely concentrated in poor
urban communities. While the HOPE VI program
has since made great strides in creating mixed-
income housing communities, a 1998 study showed
that in the late 1990s more than half of public hous-
ing residents lived in high-poverty neighborhoods,
and only 7.5 percent lived in low-poverty neighbor-
hoods (where fewer than 10 percent of residents are
poor).56
Urban “redevelopment” programs, meanwhile, have
been a very mixed blessing. Looking back, few direct
governmental programs had as dramatic of an impact
on cities as urban renewal. Created to remove slums
and blight and “modernize” older areas through mass
demolition, eminent domain, and new construction,
renewal projects did help rejuvenate some city neigh-
borhoods. But they also dealt a major blow to many
urban—often predominantly black—communities,
removing or destroying thousands of vibrant, if run
down, homes and businesses and replacing them with
high-rises and highways. And while more recent pro-
grams—e.g. Urban Empowerment Zones—have not
necessarily had an adverse impact on urban neighbor-
hoods, it’s not apparent that they’ve helped spur
widespread market rejuvenation, either. In the mean-
time, federal laws governing brownfields, for
instance, have actually helped thwart redevelopment
in many cities, making the procedural and legal steps
of testing, acquiring, cleaning, and redeveloping con-
taminated sites so complicated, time consuming, and
expensive that they scare potential investors away. 
In short, the federal government has been com-
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plicit in helping to create and sustain the economic
condition of older industrial cities—and thus needs
to consider its own agenda for helping to spur their
recovery. 
Local Barriers
While part of the blame for older industrial cities’
continued economic malaise lies with states and the
federal government, local governments have
undoubtedly contributed to their own fate through
bloated government structures and a host of every-
day inefficiencies and long-term ineptitudes that
repel new business and residents from locating in
the city and diminish the opportunities available to
existing families. 
At the most basic level, cities are often criticized
for their performance in providing basic services, like
picking up trash, plowing snow, and keeping public
parks, streets, and sidewalks clean—not to even men-
tion making the streets safe and educating the cities’
children. But while citizens are all too aware of defi-
ciencies, many cities don’t maintain accurate, pub-
licly available data and documentation on how well
they are actually performing these services, and how
much it is costing them to do so.57 Simultaneously,
the internal processes for administering local govern-
ment services are often opaque such that local resi-
dents and businesses have little understanding about
how and why the decisions that impact them on a
daily basis are made. Such a lack of accountability
and transparency can mask mismanagement, incom-
petence, and corruption, in the process undermining
both the public trust and local governments’ ability to
make needed improvements to broken systems.
The inability of many cities to get the basics of city
administration right extends to the legal and adminis-
trative procedures that make the process of land
reclamation and real estate development in many
urban areas time consuming and expensive. Poor and
unpredictable administration of often out-dated zon-
ing ordinances, building and fire codes, permitting
processes, and design requirements reduce develop-
ers’ confidence that they can get projects completed
on time and meet their revenue targets. And that’s
assuming land is available for development in the
first place. Quite often, the responsibility for invento-
rying, acquiring, and disposing of vacant and aban-
doned parcels is spread among multiple government
agencies, resulting in complicated, fragmented, and
inefficient systems that keep such properties off the
market and unavailable for productive reuse.58
Those projects that do get built, finally, aren’t
always necessarily the best or right ones. Too often,
cities’ economic development policies are more about
chasing after the latest fads than strategically devel-
oping and implementing plans that capitalize on their
unique assets, link to their larger metropolitan econ-
omy, and have the potential to widely benefit local
residents. The proliferation of stadium and conven-
tion center building over the past 15 years illustrates
this trend. Even with hard evidence that such proj-
ects rarely pay the expected div-
idends, city leaders continue to
pursue them.59 Fiscally-strapped
cities can also fall into an “any
development is better than
nothing” trap that leads them to
approve fast-food, gas station,
and other projects that may be
inappropriate to the strategic
development of vibrant, walkable commercial corri-
dors. Whether due to a genuine hope that they will
beat the odds, a desire for short-term (e.g. political-
cycle) returns, or simply a lack of imagination, these
types of practices allow local governments to avoid
the real challenges associated with fueling economic
growth that is robust, sustainable, and inclusive—
challenges that they must overcome together with
their state leaders and the federal government. ■
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The inability of many cities to get the basics of city
administration right extends to the legal and 
administrative procedures that make the process of 
land reclamation and real estate development 
in many urban areas time consuming and expensive.
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IV. Seizing the
Moment
F
or all the seemingly intractable challenges older industrial cities face,
there are many reasons to be optimistic about their future recovery.
Like most dense urban centers, the 65 older industrial cities have
numerous physical, economic, and cultural attributes that set them
apart from their newer, generally more homogenous, suburban coun-
terparts.Together, these attributes reflect the older industrial cities’ rich histories,
providing not only a profound sense of how and why each developed as it did, but
also a distinctive, tangible set of features to renew as a means to future growth.
To begin with, each older industrial city’s origin
and evolution is evident in its unique physical
fabric. For example: 
• 86 percent (56) of the 65 older
industrial cities grew up along
water—a river, lake, bay, or
canal that was once the primary
means by which to transport
goods in and out of the region.
Some of these cities—Baltimore,
Providence, Cleveland, and Richmond to name a
few—have worked in recent years to exploit their
waterfronts as major regional, even national,
attractions. For many others, the waterfront—still
scarred with abandoned warehouses, brownfields,
and underutilized wharfs—remains a reminder of
what was, as well as a rudiment of what could,
with money and vision, possibly be. 
• All of these cities have local bus service, 14 have
a subway or light rail system, and 43 have
Amtrak service to another city.60 These sys-
tems were enabled by—and helped
shape—what is still a dense urban grid.
While the quality and capacity of these
cities’ bus and rail networks may have
diminished over time, the “bones” are
there to be upgraded and expanded
upon to support new growth. 
• These 65 cities together have 4,209 properties on
the National Register of Historic Places.61 This
number doesn’t include, of course, the thousands
of additional homes and small businesses that
together help shape the many great streets and
walkable communities located in these cities.
While some of these neighborhoods may have lost
some of their former luster, they represent a
major opportunity to capture new growth. 
In addition to their physical characteristics, the 65
older industrial cities also have strong economic
attributes that will necessarily be key to their recov-
ery. For example:
• Despite their sluggish economies, older industrial
cities remain significant regional employment
centers. Home to just 26 percent of their metro-
politan populations, they still contain, on average,
a third of their metropolitan jobs. Fourteen older
industrial cities have at least half of their metro
area jobs, with three cities (Decatur, IL, Muncie,
IN, and Odessa, TX) boast-
ing over three-quarters.62
• Employment tends to be
clustered in older industrial
cities’ still-dense downtown
cores, and many have been
experiencing a surge in job
and/or population growth.
Center City Philadelphia,
for example, comprises just 3 percent of the city’s
land area, but accounts for 47 percent of all pri-
vate-sector wages paid citywide.63 And Baltimore
is one of numerous older industrial city down-
towns whose population has jumped over the past
decade; its downtown also gained 6,200 jobs (a 
7 percent increase) during the past two years
alone.64
• Older industrial cities have a large concentration
of education and medical facilities in their urban
core. The 65 cities boast a total of 242 four-year
colleges and universities and 164 two-year 
colleges, for example, with all but two of the
cities (New Bedford, MA and Saginaw, MI) 
having at least one four-year or two-year college
within their borders.65 These cities also have a
total of 470 hospitals and medical centers, includ-
ing 288 general medicine and surgical hospitals
and another 182 specialty facilities that together
employ approximately 680,800 people.66 
Finally, America’s older industrial cities are rich
with social and cultural amenities such as muse-
ums, theater, music, and sports, and possess the
dynamic mix of people that characterizes city life.
For example: 
• Older industrial cities boast a significant number
of cultural institutions and organizations that
serve as both local amenities as well as regional
and even national attractions. All told, these cities
have nearly 300 museums—from art museums to
zoos—approximately 60 resident philharmonic
and symphony orchestras, and over 30 resident
opera companies.67 These numbers don’t include,
of course, the dozens of galleries, theaters, public
art displays, and music venues that are often con-
centrated in and around downtown areas. 
• Older industrial cities have over three dozen pro-
fessional sports teams, including 10 members of
the National Football League, nine members of
the National Basketball Association, six members
of the National Hockey League, 10 Major League
Baseball teams, and two professional women’s
basketball teams.68 This is in addition to the many
minor league teams located in small- and
medium-sized older industrial cities. 
• Finally, older industrial cities’ culture is embedded
in their vibrant public street life—that unique
interaction of people that Jane Jacobs refers to as
the “sidewalk ballet.”69 The diversity of people liv-
ing, working, and playing in close proximity to
one another contributes to the very “city-ness”
that makes urban areas so special—and invokes a
sense of place, unpredictability, and excitement
often missing in newer communities. 
The time is ripe for state and local leaders to seize
upon demographic, economic, social, and political
trends and attitudes that have begun to revalue cities’
special characteristics. The 1990s brought a sea
change in how urban areas are viewed—as places in
which to invest, conduct business, live, and visit. The
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The time is ripe for state and local leaders to seize upon
demographic, economic, social, and political trends and 
attitudes that have begun to revalue cities’ special 
characteristics.
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Older industrial cities boast a range of physical, economic, and cultural assets
Four-Year Hospitals Major
Colleges and League
Historic and Two-Year Medical Sports
City State Properties Universities Colleges Facilities Museums Teams
Albany GA 21 1 2 2 2 0
Albany NY 57 6 4 5 7 0
Allentown PA 17 2 2 4 2 0
Altoona PA 14 1 0 4 3 0
Baltimore MD 9 13 3 22 18 2
Beaumont TX 13 1 1 6 3 0
Binghamton NY 20 1 1 3 2 0
Birmingham AL 137 5 2 16 4 0
Bridgeport CT 54 1 2 3 1 0
Buffalo NY 66 6 3 11 7 2
Canton OH 38 1 2 3 3 0
Cincinnati OH 242 7 10 16 6 3
Cleveland OH 216 8 4 14 9 3
Danville VA 2 1 1 2 3 0
Dayton OH 98 2 6 8 5 0
Decatur IL 8 1 1 2 0 0
Detroit MI 227 4 2 14 4 5
Erie PA 28 3 4 7 1 0
Fall River MA 104 0 1 3 1 0
Flint MI 19 5 1 3 2 0
Fresno CA 29 4 4 9 3 0
Harrisburg PA 35 2 3 3 2 0
Hartford CT 131 2 1 4 3 0
Huntington WV 27 1 3 7 1 0
Jackson MS 51 4 2 11 6 0
Kalamazoo MI 40 2 1 4 2 0
Lancaster PA 78 2 3 3 8 0
Long Beach CA 16 1 3 7 3 0
Los Angeles CA 155 24 6 31 21 6
Macon GA 69 3 1 6 3 0
Mansfield OH 48 2 1 2 0 0
Merced CA 10 1 1 1 1 0
Miami FL 67 8 6 19 8 3
Milwaukee WI 162 11 1 17 5 2
Muncie IN 37 1 3 1 3 0
New Bedford MA 32 0 0 1 2 0
New Haven CT 60 3 1 3 3 0
New Orleans LA 142 8 2 14 13 2
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Older industrial cities boast a range of physical, economic, and cultural assets (continued)
Four-Year Hospitals Major
Colleges and League
Historic and Two-Year Medical Sports
City State Properties Universities Colleges Facilities Museums Teams
Newark NJ 73 3 1 6 4 0
Odessa TX 1 1 1 5 1 0
Philadelphia PA 517 18 8 29 28 4
Pine Bluff AR 52 1 1 2 2 0
Pittsburgh PA 149 9 14 19 9 3
Port Arthur TX 6 0 1 3 1 0
Providence RI 155 5 0 6 4 0
Reading PA 30 3 2 2 2 0
Richmond VA 20 7 3 10 12 0
Rochester NY 111 6 4 5 8 0
Rocky Mount NC 15 1 1 2 1 0
Saginaw MI 29 0 0 5 2 0
San Bernardino CA 4 2 2 3 1 0
Santa Maria CA 1 0 2 1 2 0
Schenectady NY 19 2 2 4 2 0
Scranton PA 26 2 2 4 3 0
Shreveport LA 58 3 4 14 4 0
Springfield MA 81 3 1 4 2 0
Springfield OH 29 1 1 2 3 0
St. Louis MO 7 15 5 23 15 3
Stockton CA 17 2 2 3 1 0
Syracuse NY 70 4 5 7 6 0
Terre Haute IN 41 2 2 4 1 0
Trenton NJ 40 1 0 5 5 0
Utica NY 22 2 3 3 1 0
Warren OH 9 0 2 3 0 0
Youngstown OH 48 1 1 5 3 0
Total: 4209 242 164 470 293 38
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2007; AHA Annual Survey Database: FY 2005;
National Register of Historic Places, 2007; American Association of Museums, 2007; NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB, WNBA, MLS
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result has been a return of the market in many
cities—or at least substantial parts of cities—that the
private sector had once abandoned, and then ignored. 
Unfortunately, most older industrial cities, as yet,
have received only a small taste of the benefits of
recovery. While the potential is clearly there, many of
the attributes described above are still largely under-
leveraged by state and local leaders, and undervalued
by the marketplace. To be sure, many of these places
have experienced strong pockets of success—a surge
in downtown living and real estate, the gentrification
of certain historic neighborhoods—but as their city-
wide statistics demonstrate, these achievements have
been largely marginal in scale. The moment is now,
however, to turn the tide.
The Demographic Moment
Major demographic shifts are changing the size,
makeup, and locational choices of the nation’s house-
holds:
• Unlike Europe and Japan, the United States is on
a sustained path of population growth, increasing
by 33 million people during the course of the
1990s. In fact, every state in the union experi-
enced some growth during the decade, as did 
93 percent of the nation’s metropolitan areas.70
According to Census estimates, the country’s 
population is expected to rise by at least another
67 million people by 2025.71
• Immigration is fueling much of this national
growth—approximately 9.1 million immigrants
came to the U.S. legally during the 1990s, 
1.8 million more than arrived during the 1980s.
Twelve percent of the country’s current popula-
tion was born outside the U.S.—the highest share
since 1930, and one that, based on existing
trends, is likely to grow.72
• Meanwhile, our domestic population is aging. 
In 2000, residents over 65 accounted for almost
13 percent of the total population, a share that
will continue to rise as the baby boomers move
into “senior” status.73 These trends point to an
increasing demand for young workers in the
decades to come: By 2012, the workforce will be
losing more than two workers for every one it
gains.74
• The nation’s family structure is changing. Men
and woman are delaying marriage and having
fewer children, which, together with the aging
population, are causing households to become
smaller and more numerous.75 The average house-
hold size fell from 3.1 persons in 1970 to 2.6 in
2000, while the overall number of households
increased by 66 percent.76 Of the 32 million
households projected to be added between 2000
and 2025, only 4 million will have children.77
These trends will have a profound influence on
how and where people choose to live, and could sig-
nificantly benefit older industrial cities and other
established communities. 
In the first place, most older industrial cities have
the opportunity to capture a portion of their metro-
politan growth. While population growth in these
cities’ metropolitan areas during the 1990s was much
slower overall than that in the metros of the other
cities in the dataset (5 percent versus 18 percent),
only 13 older industrial city metros actually lost resi-
dents. Some of these cities are also actively capitaliz-
ing upon positive economic and demographic trends
in proximate metros. Baltimore’s “Live Baltimore”
campaign, for example, has been promoting its com-
paratively affordable housing and convenient transit
access to Washingtonians who want proximity to the
nation’s capital without the high costs. The potential
is much the same in cities like Providence,
Springfield, New Bedford, and Fall River (near
Boston) and Scranton, Allentown, Trenton, and New
Haven (near New York), which are also experiencing
similar “overflow” effects.78
Continued growth in the immigrant population, if
managed well, could also be a boon to slow—or no—
growth cities. Urban areas have always been, and
continue to be, major gateways for foreign newcom-
ers, and many cities that grew in the 1990s would
not have grown at all—or would have shrunk even
more—but for these groups. Allentown’s population
increased by 1 percent during the decade, for
instance, but were it not for a 120 percent increase
in its Hispanic population, the city would actually
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have lost 12 percent of its residents.79 Several of the
65 older industrial cities’ metropolitan areas, more-
over—including Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and St.
Louis, as well as Utica and Hartford, to name just a
few—have over the past few decades gained signifi-
cant numbers of foreign refugees.80 While the inte-
gration of foreign immigrants is certainly not without
challenges, over the long term these newcomers can
bring about substantial benefits. Recent research has
shown, for example, that over the past decade, immi-
grants nationwide have started a greater share of new
businesses than native-born residents, and have had
an enormous effect on job growth and neighborhood
revitalization in urban areas.81
Changing household structures, meanwhile,
already appear to be fueling a demand for more
urban environments—a trend that will likely acceler-
ate in the upcoming decades.
Older industrial cities have an excellent opportu-
nity to sell themselves to the nation’s burgeoning
number of seniors, for example, many of whom may
be looking to give up their suburban homes in favor
of environments that provide walkable access to
shopping, services, and medical facilities. There are
already signs that growing num-
bers of middle-aged “empty
nesters” are exploring city life-
styles: The number of married
couples without children living
in a sample of the nation’s
downtowns—a group that
includes those whose children
have grown, as well as childless
couples—grew 17 percent dur-
ing the 1990s, after having
dropped the previous two
decades.82 Though growing
numbers of seniors and Boomer
“pre-seniors” will continue, on
balance, to live in suburban
areas, those migrating into
cities in recent years exhibit
higher incomes than those leav-
ing cities for the suburbs, and
clearly have some preference
for denser, urban living.83
These cities are also well-positioned to attract what
Joseph Cortright calls “the young and restless”—
those coveted younger members of the workforce
who will be needed to fill the jobs seniors vacate.
Attitudinal changes toward urban areas among this
demographic are showing up in their locational
choices: In 2000, 25- to 34-year olds were about 
33 percent more likely than other Americans to live
in a close-in metropolitan neighborhood, up from 
12 percent in 1990.84 Downtowns, particularly, have
experienced a tremendous surge in young residents:
From 1970 to 2000, the number of 25- to 34-year
olds living in a sample of the country’s downtowns
grew 90 percent, and their share of the overall down-
town population nearly doubled, jumping from 
13 percent to almost 25 percent. Several older indus-
trial cities are already magnets for this cohort: As of
2000, young adults comprised over 30 percent of
Philadelphia’s downtown, for example, and nearly 
27 percent of Milwaukee’s. If these trends persist,
cities will have a strong upper hand in the increas-
ingly competitive race to replace retiring workers.85
Whether young, old, or somewhere in between,
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America’s new urbanites are presumably choosing
cities because of the unique range of choices they
offer—in neighborhoods, housing, shopping, and
transportation—as well as the many historic, cultural,
and recreational amenities described above. Such
options and attributes are not generally as rich or
plentiful in newer, less dense suburban areas, and,
given the nation’s shifting demographic patterns, the
number of neighborhoods that offer them may actu-
ally be falling in short supply. In fact, a recent prefer-
ence survey by Levine and Frank revealed a shortage
of compact, mixed-use, walkable communities in
many regions, signifying a tremendous opportunity
for older industrial cities that haven’t yet experienced
the robust population increases enjoyed by the
nation’s more successful urban areas.86 To the extent
that they can both leverage their assets and provide
the good services, safe streets, and quality neighbor-
hoods those with choices demand, these cities, too,
can attract the critical mass of residents needed to
create a virtuous cycle of population and housing
growth. 
The Economic Moment
A dynamic economic moment is also now underway,
a result of a fundamental restructuring of the global
economy: 
• Globalization has accelerated the shift of our
economy from the production of commodities, to
the design, marketing, and delivery of goods, serv-
ices, and ideas. Services employment grew by 214
percent from 1970 to 2000 as manufacturing
declined, and now represents 32 percent of all
jobs in the country.87
• The shift to a knowledge and innovation economy
demands greater numbers of highly educated,
highly skilled workers—now the
single biggest driver of eco-
nomic growth across metro-
politan areas.88
• The role and function of uni-
versities, colleges, medical
research institutions, and other
institutions of higher learning in
economic development and community revitaliza-
tion is growing and changing.89
• The growth of the knowledge economy is altering
the value and function of density and proximity,
which is widely held to help accelerate the trans-
fer of knowledge and ideas between people and
firms.
While globalization and technological change have
undoubtedly contributed to the decline of those cities
reliant on “old economy” industries, moving forward,
they also have the potential to give them back their
competitive edge. 
For example, while heavy manufacturing often
requires vast amounts of land in locations convenient
for transporting raw materials and finished goods—
one reason why so many firms left the urban core—
service firms and new economy industries (including
some types of advanced manufacturing) are generally
more flexible in their demand for space. Further,
competitive pressures and technological change are
increasingly causing firms to disaggregate their physi-
cal locations by function, locating their “command-
and-control” functions (e.g., headquarters,
marketing), research and development facilities, con-
sumer servicing operations, and distribution centers
in separate locations from one another.90 Cities
undoubtedly have the ability to compete for the first
three of these functions with their suburban counter-
parts, provided they can attract and grow the skilled
workers such jobs demand. 
And so they are. Although the average share of resi-
dents with a bachelor’s degree is lower, on average, in
older industrial cities than in their metropolitan
areas, the reverse is actually true for the 237 other
cities—demonstrating the attractiveness of urban
environments for many educated workers.
Meanwhile, the number of downtown 
residents with a college degree has sky-
rocketed: By 2000, almost 44 percent 
of residents in a sample of downtowns 
had a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
up 10 percentage points from 1990.
Some older industrial cities are already
sharing in this trend: The downtowns
of Philadelphia (66.7 percent),
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Milwaukee (46.2 percent), and Baltimore (45.7 per-
cent) were each among the top 10 based on their
share of residents with a bachelor’s degree.91
Considering that, nationally, just over 24 percent of
residents held a higher degree in 2000, these num-
bers can be a major selling point for cities in their
quest to attract new firms.92
Meanwhile, the enhanced role of colleges and uni-
versities is providing nearly all older industrial cities
with an unprecedented chance to leverage the myriad
economic benefits they provide. Beyond their role as
educators, these institutions are vital to many local
and regional economies, as trainers of the future
workforce, as incubators of new knowledge economy
firms, and as employers, purchasers, and real estate
developers. They are also increasingly fueling eco-
nomic growth and revitalization, helping breathe life
into faltering downtowns—as in Cleveland—influenc-
ing neighborhood planning and development—as in
Philadelphia—and stimulating new local enter-
prises—as in Pittsburgh. Perhaps most significantly,
these schools are growing their roles as civic leaders,
actively participating in decision-making about
improving the health and vitality of their surrounding
cities and regions.93
Finally, density may matter as never before. A vari-
ety of new urban scholars has begun to suggest that
denser labor markets and more vibrant urban centers
can actually improve economic performance, giving
cities a clear advantage over many of their suburban
counterparts. These scholars start from the premise,
foreshadowed over 100 years ago by Alfred Marshall,
that density is a primary purpose of cities, and that
clusterings of talented people are a prime driver of
economic growth.94 Cities, and other dense agglomer-
ations of economic activity, facilitate firms’ ability to
access workers and suppliers, and foster the “knowl-
edge spillovers”—the sharing of information and
ideas—essential to spurring the innovations that
increasingly drive economic competitiveness.95
Density also matters on the labor side of the equa-
tion. The large number of employers within an urban
area allows workers to change jobs more easily, giving
them both greater flexibility and
stability than employees in non-
urban locales. 
Stronger market communities
are already reaping the benefits
of these economic shifts. But
private sector companies are
also increasingly investing in
weaker cities and more dis-
tressed neighborhoods as suburban markets become
saturated. Catalytic investment firms are working
with the public sector and nonprofit communities on
transformative investment strategies designed to stim-
ulate market demand in places like downtown
Detroit, the Baltimore harbor area, and elsewhere. At
the same time, national retailers like Home Depot
and Target are modifying their “big box” format to
“fit” more dense urban environments—a sure sign
that they are starting to view cities as untapped mar-
kets ripe for investment. Smaller cities, too, are see-
ing increased private sector activity, and growing
engagement by nonprofit institutions like hospitals
and universities. In Lancaster, PA, for example,
Franklin and Marshall College is partnering with a
hospital, a local BID, and local workforce and eco-
nomic development agencies on a major project to
grow healthcare, biotechnology,
communication/information technology, and agricul-
ture/food processing firms in the northwest part of
the city.96 While all this activity isn’t yet at the scale
needed to make up for older industrial cities’ lost
industrial base, it sends a positive—long overdue—
signal to other potential investors, entrepreneurs, and
institutions that these communities might be good
places in which do business. 
A variety of new urban scholars has begun to suggest
that denser labor markets and more vibrant urban 
centers can actually improve economic performance,
giving cities a clear advantage over many 
of their suburban counterparts.
The Political and Constituency
Moment
Lastly, cities have an opportunity to take advantage of
a profound political and constituency moment, as
public sector and nonprofit leaders are beginning to
understand that strong urban economies are key to
building family security, healthy neighborhoods, and
sustainable, prosperous regions:
• State leaders are recognizing—and are acting
upon—the link between city revitalization and
competitive regional growth. 
• Foundations are realizing that many of their
objectives—reducing poverty, improving neighbor-
hoods, protecting the environment—are depend-
ent upon a strong and vibrant urban core, and
their support for projects to revitalize older indus-
trial cities is growing.
• Community development organizations are
increasingly interested in market-based solutions
to building neighborhood wealth. 
• Environmental and smart growth groups are
focusing on the nexus between the revitalization
of city cores and environmental sustainability. 
To begin with, there are clear signs that some state
leaders understand the importance of economically
and fiscally strong cities. For example, in 2003, then
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney created an
Office for Commonwealth Development (OCD) to
pursue a state smart growth agenda focused on revi-
talizing existing communities, supporting compact,
walkable development, expanding housing and job
opportunities, and protecting the environment.97
Michigan’s Gov. Granholm has made investments in
cities an explicit part of the state’s economic develop-
ment plan, with millions of dollars targeted toward
brownfields remediation, regional planning, and local
infrastructure improvements. In 2005, she also
launched “Cities of Promise,” a five-year initiative that
requires 18 state agencies to work collaboratively with
eight of the state’s most distressed cities—including
Detroit, Saginaw, and Flint—to reduce poverty, spark
economic development and investment, and improve
blighted neighborhoods in these communities.98 And
in Pennsylvania, the Rendell administration is focus-
ing on the links between economic growth, a skilled
workforce, and targeted government investments that
at once protect open space, shore up fading towns
and cities, and clean up polluted sites. Tangible
efforts are already underway: The state has created a
$625 million bond fund, for example, to support the
state’s Growing Greener II program, which will be tar-
geted directly towards environmental projects, and
downtown and community revitalization.99
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Some new governors, too, are speaking in “urban”
terms. New York’s Gov. Spitzer, for example, is already
discussing specific new policy directions for reinvigo-
rating struggling communities, particularly in
Upstate. His Renew New York agenda aims to signifi-
cantly expand state aid to distressed Upstate cities
and towns, reinvigorate the state’s brownfields pro-
gram, and expand high-speed internet access in
underserved urban and rural areas, among other
things.100 Such “new blood” in states with large con-
centrations of older industrial cities provides a
unique chance to advance an agenda specifically
aimed at these cities’ interests. 
Many philanthropic, civic, and community develop-
ment organizations are also beginning to advance a
new form of urban revitalization that focuses on mar-
ket revival. These groups are now integrating poverty
and housing initiatives with better schools, parks,
transit, and public safety, and launching programs
focused on entrepreneurship and wealth building.
They are also getting involved in initiatives focused
on increasing economic competitiveness and the cre-
ation of quality jobs. The Heinz Endowments, for
example, has established an Innovation Economy
Program to help spur the commercialization of
research and innovations coming out of local univer-
sities and hospitals in the Pittsburgh region.101 Urban
League chapters nationwide are increasingly focused
on closing the wealth gap between blacks and whites,
phasing out many of its social programs in lieu of ini-
tiatives focused on entrepreneurship, workforce
development, and commercial real estate develop-
ment.102 PolicyLink’s Core Cities Initiative is working
with public and private sector institutions to bring
greater attention, resources, and equitable policy
change to America’s economically distressed cities,
including many of those identified here.103 And local
groups like Neighborhood Progress, Inc., in
Cleveland, are making private sector investment in
community assets an explicit part of their core mis-
sion, noting that it “is the best way to restore neigh-
borhood vitality and improve people’s quality of
life.”104
Finally, environmental and smart growth leaders
are increasingly focused on the critical role that cities
play in curbing sprawl, conserving open space, reduc-
ing pollution, and enhancing the nation’s energy effi-
ciency. Three years ago, for example, Smart Growth
America (SGA)—in partnership with LISC (the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation) and the
Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech—launched
the National Vacant Properties campaign, a major
initiative designed to provide city leaders with infor-
mation resources, tools, and technical assistance to
support their vacant property revitalization efforts.
SGA is also now an active partner in helping to
organize statewide networks to advance state and
local agendas for renewing
older industrial cities.105
At a more regional level, Scenic
Hudson has been working for
40 years to protect and restore
the Hudson River Valley, a mis-
sion which includes renewing
brownfields sites and revitaliz-
ing core towns and cities.106 And
PennFuture not only has a state-focused “fix it first”
action campaign, but has also added the Next Great
City Initiative—dedicated to increasing the economic
competitiveness and environmental health of
Philadelphia—to its list of environmental protection
programs.107
New attitudes and practices regarding density and
development patterns are still evolving. Yet efforts to
date demonstrate that older industrial cities have an
unprecedented opportunity to build broad-based
coalitions around market-oriented approaches to
urban revitalization—network building that will be
crucial to their ability to seize upon the demographic
and economic trends now at hand. ■
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Many philanthropic, civic, and community development
organizations are also beginning to advance a new form
of urban revitalization that focuses on market revival.
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While most discussions of urban policy tend to
focus almost exclusively on local action and federal
programs, states—for all the reasons cited above—are
critical partners in any plans for cities’ revitalization.
Good things are already happening at the state
level—but they are not enough. To truly catalyze
older industrial cities’ recovery, state leaders need a
comprehensive urban agenda—one that both
redresses state policies and practices that undermine
urban prosperity, and advances proactive, innovative
ideas for change. Such an agenda needs to cut across
what are typically separate and siloed policy areas,
and should have five primary objectives: 
• To help older industrial cities “fix the basics”
needed to ensure that they are high quality, 
fiscally healthy communities
• To help older industrial cities build upon their
economic strengths so that they can create a
“high road” economy of knowledge, innovation,
and entrepreneurship
V. A State Agenda
for Revitalizing
America’s Older
Industrial Cities 
C
ertainly, there appears to be no better time in recent history
for reinventing and reinvigorating older industrial city
economies. But to capitalize on positive trends, these communi-
ties need a new strategy for change—one that moves beyond
policies and programs aimed at managing urban decline, and
instead includes a set of integrated policies and practices that together aim to
improve city-wide market performance. Such a strategy must start with local lead-
ers, who must develop and articulate their own vision for success, and advance a
plan for realizing it. But they can’t go it alone.
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• To help older industrial cities transform their
physical landscapes with investments that can
catalyze development and stimulate economic
growth
• To help older industrial cities grow their middle
class by helping low-wage workers build skills,
income, and wealth 
• To help older industrial cities create neighbor-
hoods of choice for people of varying incomes
While the emphasis will vary from state to state
based on their current policy environment and the
unique needs of their cities, it’s vital that state lead-
ers understand that true urban recovery will require
them to tackle each of these objectives—and will
demand an earnest commitment to wholesale change. 
Fix the Basics
In the first place, states need to do their part to help
cities address the fundamentals. Even the best efforts
at urban revitalization will have little
chance of succeeding if the educa-
tional system is broken, residents
and visitors feel unsafe, and the fis-
cal climate for businesses and resi-
dents simply “prices them out” of
locating in the city. It’s thus vital that
states help their cities “fix the
basics”— improving K–12 schools,
curbing crime, and creating a cost climate competi-
tive with cities’ surrounding jurisdictions. 
Transform neighborhood schools
Fixing the basics begins with the schools. The lagging
performance of older industrial cities’ K–12 sys-
tems—as measured by their low test scores, high
drop out rates, and the meager share of students that
move on to attain a college degree—has a dual
impact on these cities’ economic competitiveness.
Most troubling is the fact that local children—partic-
ularly those that are poor and/or minority—are miss-
ing out on the instruction they need to pursue higher
education and quality jobs. But failing schools also
deter middle class families from locating, or staying,
in the city, depressing the local tax base and hamper-
ing cities’ ability to make crucial investments in the
educational system. 
Already substantial funders of local districts, states
need to undertake a series of reforms to ensure that
failing local districts have adequate resources, quality
teachers, and modern facilities located in stable
neighborhoods. First, states need to examine and
update their funding formulas such that their invest-
ments are being fairly distributed across jurisdictions
on a stable and predictable basis. Recent analysis by
The Education Trust, for example, found that, after
adjusting for local costs of providing education, over
50 percent of states actually provide less funding per
pupil to high-poverty, high-minority school districts
than low-poverty, low-minority districts.108 Second,
states should invest additional resources to help
attract good teachers to schools in distressed urban
areas and other challenging environments. This
means not only ensuring that their base salaries,
working conditions, and training oppor-
tunities are competitive with wealthier
suburban districts, but also providing
bonuses—as North Carolina has
done—for attracting, and keeping,
highly qualified instructors in hard-
to-staff schools. Third, states should
follow the lead of Massachusetts by
funding longer school days in strug-
gling districts. The state is currently expending about
$1300 day per student to lengthen the traditional
school day in 10 pilot schools, an effort that Gov.
Patrick is planning to expand.109 Finally, states need to
help cities improve the environment in which stu-
dents learn each day by targeting major investments
toward capital improvements in aging inner-city
schools. States should require that such funding is
part of long-term local plans to make surrounding
neighborhoods safe, stable communities for the chil-
dren and families who live there. 
Make the streets safe
Public safety is “basic” number two. High crime rates
can stall city revitalization efforts, not only by dimin-
ishing the quality of urban life, but by signaling to
investors and potential residents that government is
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unable to meet one of its most essential obligations—
protecting their citizens and businesses. But while
local governments are generally responsible for polic-
ing and for the prosecution of crimes, states, too,
play a large role in the criminal justice system. States
are responsible for the administration of prison sys-
tems, probation and parole programs, and many juve-
nile, substance abuse, and mental illness programs.110
States also control the distribution of a significant
amount of federal—and state—criminal justice fund-
ing directed to localities.111
As a result of its power and responsibilities, states
can serve as valuable funders, partners, and catalysts
for more effective crime control strategies in cities, in
several ways. In the first place, governors can help
improve the coordination of criminal justice
resources, serving as leaders in the effort to bring the
many players in the criminal justice system to the
table to reduce crime. In Michigan, for example, 
Gov. Granholm convened a 2004 Task Force on Jail
and Prison Overcrowding to bring state and county
governments together to ensure that limited
resources for incarceration were being focused on
incarcerating the most violent offenders.112 States can
also help local police departments improve the effec-
tiveness of policing by funding state-of-the-art data
systems—like New York’s well-known CompStat sys-
tem—to measure crime and manage police resources.
Finally—and perhaps most significantly—states can
play a powerful role in reducing the number of crimi-
nals who keep cycling through the system, working
with local governments to design programs to help
released offenders find housing and employment, and
to get the substance abuse and mental health support
they need in order to become healthy, productive
urban residents. Under Washington State’s
Community Juvenile Accountability Act, for instance,
local courts and governments are encouraged to
develop evidence-based programs to reduce recidi-
vism. The state has also been a leader in efforts to
make substance abuse and mental health services
available to juvenile offenders.113
Create a competitive cost climate for 
businesses and residents
Fixing the basics, finally, requires structural changes
in the way older industrial cities raise and spend rev-
enue. Constrained on one side of the ledger by their
inability to levy new fees and taxes, and on the other
by rising pension, health care, and other costs they
can’t fully control, economically distressed cities are
in a constant battle to make their fiscal ends meet.
Such stress gets passed on to firms and residents in
the form of high taxes and diminished services, a poi-
sonous mix that can dissuade potential investors from
considering the city as a viable home or business
location, and even send committed city dwellers run-
ning for the suburbs. 
New York Neighborhood Work Project (NWP)
In New York City, the Center for Employment Opportunities(CEO) provides transitional employment and job development and
placement services to offenders leaving the state prison system on
parole. Former offenders start on the path to full employment by
working on the center’s Neighborhood Work Project (NWP) transi-
tional work crew, which allows them to gain work experience and
earn a minimum wage.The NWP program is funded through a
unique financial arrangement with the New York State Division of
Parole. NWP work crews provide services for public agencies, and
may perform such jobs as cleaning courthouses, collecting litter on
highways, or painting classrooms in public colleges in the New York
City area.While CEO has a basic contract with the Division of Parole,
individual public agencies can pay for CEO work crews under that
contract and make payments to the Division of Parole through an
internal service fund. Once participants demonstrate consistent atten-
dance in NWP and other pre-employment activities, 60 percent are
able to graduate to permanent employment. Moreover, a 2006
CEO/MDRC analysis of the program found that, among CEO partici-
pants, successful placement in a job resulted in a 30 percent reduction
in re-incarceration over a three year period.114
For more information: www.ceoworks.org/homepage.htm 
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While local governments need to take responsibility
for controlling costs and streamlining service provi-
sion, states can improve the fiscal milieu in which
they operate and, in the process, help “level the play-
ing field” between cities and suburbs. States could do
several things, first of all, to bolster cities’ often pre-
carious revenue situations. These include providing
localities more flexibility to develop local option rev-
enue sources (such as excise taxes and various types
of fees) so that they are not so reliant on the property
tax, as well as allowing—and incentivizing—revenue
sharing among neighboring jurisdictions so as to limit
unproductive competition for retail and firms. States
could also do a better job distributing local (non-
school) aid in a more predictable and fair way, with
special attention to the needs of their struggling
cities. They might, for example, create a payment-in-
lieu-of taxes (PILOT) program, like that employed by
Connecticut, paying cities and other municipalities 
a set percent of the projected property taxes they
would collect if their universities, hospitals, and other
nonprofit institutions were taxable. 
States can also play a major role in helping cities
curb expenditures. Giving localities greater latitude to
renegotiate retirement and healthcare packages with
their employees, for instance, as well providing more
transparency in the system regarding who man-
dates—and who ultimately pays—municipal employee
pension benefits, would be important first steps in
helping cities reign in the skyrocketing costs of
increasingly outmoded benefit systems. 
Build on Economic Strengths
Second, states need an economic development plan
that focuses explicitly on reinvigorating their cities
and other older communities. The most effective way
to accomplish this is to build off these communities’
existing economic strengths—by making targeted
investments designed to renew the downtown core,
supporting industries where cities and their metros
have a clear competitive advantage, and enhancing
both the physical and the economic connections
between cities and regions. 
Invest in downtown revitalization
Over the past 15 years, there has been an amazing
revival in downtowns across America, including sev-
eral older industrial cities: From 1990 to 2000, for
example, nine of 12 older industrial cities included in
a study of 44 U.S. cities saw their downtown popula-
tion increase, indicating a pent-
up demand for urban living
even in cities that are otherwise
struggling to keep and attract
residents and businesses.115 This
boost in population and hous-
ing in turn helps fuel an
increase in retail establishments
and eventually offices and
employment, and can have a positive “spillover”
effect on surrounding neighborhoods.116
While a strong downtown doesn’t necessarily assure
a strong citywide economy, it’s certainly a prerequisite
for success. As such, it’s vital that states help cities
“set the stage” to bring people and businesses back to
the core. At the most basic level, this can include
seed funding to help cities undertake a diagnostic of
the downtown, including the number and type of
downtown jobs and businesses, its role in the metro-
politan economy, its contribution to local government
taxes, the structure and state of its transit system, the
condition of its infrastructure, etc. Local government,
business, and community leaders can then use this
information to develop a long-range strategic plan for
market revitalization that sets a concrete goal—for
example, that 2 percent of all metropolitan residents
While a strong downtown doesn’t necessarily 
assure a strong citywide economy,
it’s certainly a prerequisite for success.
T
H
E
 B
R
O
O
K
IN
G
S
 I
N
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
 M
E
T
R
O
P
O
L
IT
A
N
 P
O
L
IC
Y
 P
R
O
G
R
A
M
V
.
A
 S
T
A
T
E
 A
G
E
N
D
A
 F
O
R
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
48
The Road to Recovery: The Chattanooga Story
While the challenges may be steep, older industrial cities arein no way consigned to their current economic status. In
fact, 17 of the 302 cities in the dataset were able to move off the
“list” from 1990 to 2000:
Akron, OH Mobile, AL
Anderson, IN Monroe, LA
Battle Creek, MI Pueblo, CO
Chattanooga,TN Spokane,WA
Chicago, IL St. Joseph, MO
Duluth, MN Toledo, OH
Lafayette, LA Waco,TX
Lake Charles, LA Yakima,WA
Louisville, KY
All 17 of these cities experienced improvements in their economic
performance and/or residential well-being that outpaced those of
their peers over the course of the decade: 11 were strong perform-
ers on both the City Economic Performance Index and the
Residential Economic Well-Being Performance Index, and all but one
of the other six were some combination of “moderate” and “strong”
on the two indices.117 (See Section II for a more detailed description
of this analysis).
Chattanooga was one of these strong performers.This wasn’t just
by happenstance, but rather was the result of a concerted, innovative
effort on the part of city leaders—with help from the state—to rein-
vigorate the urban core.
The Chattanooga Story
In 1969, the federal government named Chattanooga the nation’s
most polluted city.118 But while dirty and deteriorating, the city contin-
ued to experience substantial gains in its manufacturing employment
during the 1970s, and aggressive annexation efforts, which more than
doubled its geographic area, allowed its population to increase.
By the 1980s, however, Chattanooga was in full free-fall. After
growing nearly 38 percent the decade before, the number of resi-
dents employed in manufacturing tumbled 28 percent.119 Employment
growth stagnated, and residents fled: In fact, the city was one of only
18 U.S. cities with a population of more than 100,000 to lose more
than 10 percent of its residents during the decade.120 By 1990,
Chattanooga had become a Rust Belt city in the middle of the Sun
Belt—and was one of the weakest cities economically in the country.
But not for long.
By the beginning of the new century, Chattanooga had trans-
formed itself right off the list of the country’s economically weakest
cities. From 1990 to 2000, employment in the city increased 17 per-
cent (while dropping an average 8 percent in the 65 older industrial
cities) and per capita income grew 21 percent (compared to 7 per-
cent in the older industrial cities). Median household income by 2000
had reached $32,000 per year (compared to just over $29,000 in 
the 65 older industrial cities), and the poverty rate had fallen below
18 percent (compared to 23 percent in the older industrial cities).121
Meanwhile, Chattanooga’s overall population increased by 2 percent
over the decade, and its number of downtown residents rose more
than 7 percent.122
So what happened? 
The story begins in the early 1980s with the creation of the
Moccasin Bend Task Force. Appointed by the county and city govern-
ment and funded by the Lyndhurst Foundation, this group was
charged with developing a plan for a 22 mile corridor along the
Tennessee River.The Task Force recognized the inherent value of
Chattanooga’s core asset—its waterfront—and recommended the
creation of the Tennessee Riverpark, the first of a series of waterfront-
related projects designed to revitalize the downtown.
A public-private partnership also led to the development of the
Vision 2000 plan. Among other things, the plan called for the preser-
vation of the Walnut Street Bridge as a pedestrian link between
downtown and North Chattanooga and the construction of a down-
town aquarium to attract visitors to the city. But Vision 2000 also
called for the creation of a new effort to create affordable housing
throughout the city. Local philanthropic leaders, meanwhile, were also
hard at work at efforts to improve local schools.
During the 1990s, Chattanooga leaders took the best laid plans of
the 1980s and put them into action.The Tennessee Aquarium opened
in 1992. In 1993, the Walnut Street Bridge was reopened as the
longest pedestrian bridge in North America.Throughout the rest of
the decade, the city added new housing, downtown hotels, and a new
urban waterfront park across the river from downtown.
The resurgence has continued apace. In 2002, Chattanooga
embarked on the next phase of waterfront redevelopment—a 
$120 million 21st Century Waterfront Plan to make the downtown
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side of the river more accessible, create additional housing, and
expand parks and cultural venues, including the Tennessee Aquarium.
While the city facilitated the development, half of the project was
funded through private contributions; the public share of the project
was primarily funded through a new hotel/motel tax.
In addition to these transformative infrastructure projects, local
foundations and the government have also been working together on
education and neighborhood development in the city.The Benwood
Initiative, named after a local foundation, has become a national model
for turning around underperforming urban schools.
Finally, Chattanooga has taken the first steps toward recruiting
industry related to new technology. In 2002, city officials and the 
local university successfully recruited the Sim Center to come to 
the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga from Mississippi State.
The Sim Center focuses on computational engineering and is one of
several academic research centers working on hydrogen fuel cell
technology.
With all this development, tourism has become an important part
of the local economy. Between 1990 and 2004, the number of manu-
facturing jobs in Hamilton County declined by 22.5 percent, while
jobs in leisure, hospitality, accommodations and food service industries
grew by over 26 percent.123 New public and private investments in
the downtown have also allowed Chattanooga to retain and grow
jobs in other sectors, and have helped the city to retain several major
employers. For example, though mergers in the late 1990s caused
both CIGNA and Unum Provident to
consider leaving the downtown area,
together they now employ nearly 5,000
in the city’s core. And after initially con-
sidering a location outside of down-
town, Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Tennessee (BCBST)—the city’s largest
employer—is now in the midst of a
building a new $300 million headquar-
ters there. In its 2004 announcement,
Blue Cross Blue Shield’s CEO called the
decision a renewal of “our commitment
to Chattanooga and its vibrant down-
town area.”124
While local government, philanthropic, and business leaders were
the primary forces behind Chattanooga’s turnaround, state officials—
through four governors—have contributed significant funding and sup-
port along the way:
• The state of Tennessee provided direct funding for both the infra-
structure surrounding the Tennessee Aquarium and funding
related to the 21st Century Waterfront
• The state Department of Transportation, after initial resistance to
the city’s new waterfront plans, eventually turned over a key
highway to city control
• Funding for both the development of downtown’s Southside and
the Waterfront Plan was the result of state legislation: Debt serv-
ice on the Southside project was funded through tax increment
financing based on sales tax revenue and, as previously noted, the
Waterfront Plan debt is supported by a new state-approved
local hotel motel tax
• Efforts to recruit and grow the Sim Center are the result of a
direct partnership between the city and the local branch of the
University of Tennessee.
Chattanooga’s renaissance demonstrates how a comprehensive
approach, a focus on assets, and strong partnerships are key ingredi-
ents to a successful reform effort. Most importantly, though, it shows
that, however steep the challenges, change is possible.
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live downtown—and identifies specific projects and
programs the public sector should invest in to help
reach it. States can target investments according to
the plan, providing grants and loans to underwrite
“big ticket” real estate projects, upgrading infrastruc-
ture—from transit to broadband—in the downtown
area, and ensuring that state universities and commu-
nity colleges located in or near the downtown core
are key partners in the revitalization process.125 States
should also require—as Michigan and Pennsylvania
do—that downtowns be given first priority as loca-
tions for state-owned offices and facilities, as well as
look for opportunities to expand their suburban uni-
versity and community college campuses into down-
town areas. 
Focus on cities’ and metros’ competitive
niches 
For several decades, a large share of older industrial
cities have been grappling with the decline of heavy
manufacturing and the high paying jobs it provided,
and looking for the next big thing that could replace
it. These cities have been up against market forces
too powerful to be mitigated by smokestack chasing
schemes or tax incentive programs, however. What’s
needed instead is a new and improved brand of eco-
nomic development that focuses on cultivating new
firms and jobs rather than simply attracting them,
and that builds from local niches rather than borrows
from the latest national fad. 
But local governments can’t remake their
economies in a vacuum. State leaders need to do
their part to create a climate that fosters innovation
and entrepreneurialism, and must encourage growth
in industries that will fuel prosperity in cities and
their surrounding regions. This first demands that
states undertake a rigorous analysis of the type and
location of potential competitive clusters, including
the unique opportunities—and challenges—
associated with business
attraction and cluster
development in older
communities. States then
need to parlay this knowl-
edge into a concrete plan
to re-align existing economic development dollars to
capitalize on those existing strengths and niches. This
might include, for example, creating and supporting
programs to promote cutting-edge research and prod-
uct development in universities and medical centers;
investing in advanced manufacturing industries that
could take advantage of cities’ long-standing prowess
in goods production; or providing financial and other
supports—such as state-funded incubator facilities—
to inspire risk-taking among local entrepreneurs. In
Pennsylvania, for example, the Ben Franklin
Technology Partners’ (BFTP) four regional centers in
the state have for over two decades provided
resources to a number of colleges and universities to
develop technology-driven enterprises in the
Commonwealth, while its new Keystone Innovation
Zone (KIZ) program specifically focuses on aligning
the combined resources of educational institutions,
private businesses, commercial lending institutions,
venture capital networks, and foundations to increase
the rate of technology transfer and product commer-
cialization. 
Enhance the connectivity between regions
Older industrial cities, finally, have a real opportunity
to “connect up” with other cities and regions, both
physically and economically. This includes both taking
advantage of strong job markets and expanding devel-
opment in thriving metropolitan areas such as Boston
or New York, as well as building tighter workforce and
industry relationships with other nearby communities
to advance their wider regional economy. 
States can help cities and regions forge these con-
nections, in two major ways. First, state transporta-
tion dollars could be well spent on creating or
expanding rail service between older industrial cities
located in the orbit of larger hubs. Such links would
allow workers in high cost regions to take advantage
of older industrial cities’ more affordable housing,
expand employment opportunities for existing
older industrial city residents, as well as facilitate
the ability of small- and mid-sized cities to serve
as back office or satellite locations for head-
quarters located an hour or two away. Such
connections could be particularly beneficial for
R
E
S
T
O
R
IN
G
 P
R
O
S
P
E
R
IT
Y
:
T
H
E
 S
T
A
T
E
 R
O
L
E
 I
N
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
V
.
A
 S
T
A
T
E
 A
G
E
N
D
A
 F
O
R
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
51
New Bedford and Fall River, in Massachusetts, and
for cities in the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania that
are working to expand their ties to New York and
Philadelphia. 
States can also encourage stronger relationships
among cities and regions with similar economic his-
tories and assets. While individual cities and regions
naturally must work to leverage their own unique
strengths, collaboration and planning among regions
both within and across states can help these commu-
nities and their institutions develop niches that com-
plement and reinforce one another. Thus rather than
competing, neighboring metropolitan areas can
instead work cooperatively to market the wider eco-
nomic region to prospective firms, as well as to grow
strong networks of related firms—and the institutions
and infrastructure needed to support them—from
within. States can promote such collaboration
through state-wide economic analyses—like that
described above—that help individual cities and
regions better understand not only their own
economies, but the special strengths of other areas.
Moreover, states can identify ways to reorganize their
agencies and programs to better align them with the
spatial organization of the economy, even when it
crosses state lines. 
Transform the Physical
Landscape
A true commitment to urban revitalization demands
that states recognize and leverage those physical
assets of cities that are most aligned with the prefer-
ences of the changing economy, and then target their
investments and amend antiquated policies accord-
ingly. To this end, state leaders need to focus their
resources on upgrading crumbling infrastructure in
cities and older areas, invest in a few large-scale proj-
ects that have the power to truly catalyze a market
turnaround, and give cities the tools they need to
turn vacant and abandoned properties into mar-
ketable sites for development. 
Fix it first
In order for older industrial cities to be competitive
locations for businesses and families, it’s vital that
states help plan for and invest in major upgrades to
their aging infrastructure. Many sewer, water, transit,
and road systems in these cities are reaching the end
of their lifespan. The cost of needed improvements to
wastewater systems alone, for example, is estimated
to be $12.8 billion in New Jersey, $8.7 billion in
Ohio, and $8.1 billion in Pennsylvania.126
A recent issue brief by the National Governors
Association offers a series of recommendations for
how states can most efficiently and effectively utilize
their limited infrastructure resources to both save
money, and enhance their existing assets. These
include not only targeting investments toward areas
of existing infrastructure, but also prioritizing those
investments so as to help restore the economies of
particular communities.127 This is sound advice. To
achieve these goals, however, states first need to
Hartford-Springfield Partnership 
L inked by the Connecticut River, Interstate 91, a shared airport,and a common industrial and cultural heritage, Greater
Hartford, CT and Greater Springfield, MA together anchor a large and
powerful economic region that is home to nearly 1.9 million people
and spans two states. Recognizing this power, area political, business,
economic development, educational, and government leaders came
together in 2000 to form the Hartford-Springfield Economic
Partnership.The purpose of the partnership is to help these two
communities—which are located only 25 miles apart—to pool their
resources and work together to build and market the regional econ-
omy, invest in transportation and infrastructure, and secure federal
assistance. Since its inception, the partnership has focused on market-
ing the region—dubbed “New England’s Knowledge Corridor” for its
concentration of universities and history of innovation—by providing
information on its economic, educational, cultural, and other assets,
hosting tours for consultants and businesses, and exhibiting at trade
shows, among other activities.The organization sponsors research
focused on building the regional economy, as well as lobbies for poli-
cies and investments that can positively impact the corridor.
For more information: www.hartfordspringfield.com/ 
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assess where current dollars are
going, and develop strict criteria 
for determining how they might be
reallocated to improve the investment
climate in older areas. They should
also require that cities develop compre-
hensive plans outlining how the opera-
tion, maintenance, and replacement of deteriorating
infrastructure systems align with neighborhood plan-
ning and economic development goals. New Jersey’s
Transit Village Initiative, for instance, provides incen-
tives to redevelop and revitalize communities around
existing transit facilities, in accordance with munici-
palities’ own visions and plans.128 Finally, states
should examine opportunities to reduce costs by
incentivizing cooperative agreements between neigh-
boring jurisdictions to share overlapping or redundant
services and systems. 
Invest in catalytic development projects
Urban historians often recount how bold visions and
unbridled ambition—think Daniel Burnham,
Frederick Law Olmstead, or for better or worse,
Robert Moses—powerfully shaped and reshaped the
physical development of our cities. But over the past
half century, cities have focused more on small,
incremental, and often politically expedient projects
and programs that have done little to fill the eco-
nomic and physical voids left by the outflow of peo-
ple and businesses—and in some cases have actually
undermined the density and vitality that made them
distinct. 
Reinvigorating older industrial cities demands that
they start thinking creatively again about the kinds of
transformative investments that can have a true cat-
alytic effect on urban redevelopment.129 These might
include, for example, tearing down an obsolete high-
way that cuts a city off from its waterfront, redesign-
ing a large public park, or turning an abandoned
wharf into a bustling shopping and entertainment
district, among other activities. Milwaukee, for exam-
ple, spent $45 million to bring down the East Park
Thruway in 2003 and restore the street grid beneath
it, freeing up nearly 20 acres of land for new develop-
ment.130 And the continued development of
Baltimore’s Inner Harbor is one the
most well-known examples of a large-
scale waterfront redevelopment proj-
ect in the country. But even less
expensive projects can make a big
difference, as evidenced by Scranton’s
$1.9 million investment to turn its deteriorating Nay
Aug Park into a significant local amenity and regional
attraction.131 States can support such efforts by
strategically targeting economic development, trans-
portation, and other funds toward locally identified
projects designed to stimulate private investment.
Pennsylvania’s Community Action Team (CAT) pro-
gram, for example, targets the delivery of multiple
state programs and services to help communities plan
and implement specific priority “impact” projects.132
States can also catalyze local markets, as noted
above, by making smart decisions on the design and
siting of state office buildings, public university cam-
puses, and other facilities (e.g., museums, stadia)
that often receive state investments.
Create marketable sites
While older industrials cities’ residential and business
base has contracted over the past several decades,
their physical footprints have not. Instead, once
vibrant neighborhoods and industrial areas are left
with thousands of abandoned buildings and vacant,
often contaminated, lots that are costly to maintain
at the same time that they act as a drag on proximate
property values. 
States have an array of tools at their disposal that
can help cities cope with vacancy and abandonment,
and turn existing liabilities into market-ready develop-
ment opportunities for the near- and long-term. In
the first place, states are in a prime position to
develop systems to inventory and track vacant and
abandoned properties over time. States should pro-
vide funding to all local governments for the on-going
collection of parcel-based information on these
sites—including information on their location, zon-
ing, tax status, market value, and ownership—using
state-established definitions and data collection crite-
ria to facilitate collection and promote standardiza-
tion across cities. This would go a long way in
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helping cities identify and track opportunities to
assemble and redevelop vacant lots. States should
also then focus on ways to encourage large-scale
redevelopment of underused sites. This should
include: (1) reviewing and reforming tax lien foreclo-
sure laws to expedite the acquisition and disposition
of delinquent properties, which under current sys-
tems can sit idle for years before the city can take
ownership; (2) developing new tools to promote
brownfields development, such as an environmental
insurance program (like Massachusetts’), or an envi-
ronmental remediation tax-increment-financing (TIF)
program; (3) enabling the establishment of local land
banks—as Michigan has done—that allow localities
to gain clear title to vacant properties and assemble
them for future use; and (4) continuing to allow the
limited and appropriate use of eminent domain to
redevelop blighted urban areas. 
State of Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Authority
In January 2004, Michigan Governor Granholm adopted the bi-par-tisan Michigan Land Use Leadership Council’s recommendation
and signed into law the Land Bank Fast Track Legislation. Modeled in
large part on the Genesee County Land Bank Authority, this legisla-
tion explicitly enabled the creation of city and county land bank
authorities and permitted them to expedite title clearance on proper-
ties, greatly facilitating local governments’ ability to acquire, assemble,
and redevelop vacant and abandoned land and buildings and put
them back into productive use. Packaged with four additional Acts,
land banks in the state now have the power to borrow money or sell
bonds to raise revenue; buy and assemble land into larger parcels;
demolish, rehabilitate, or construct new buildings; and sell the redevel-
oped properties, among other things.133 Following the lead of
Genesee County—which has worked to foster the reuse of the over
4,000 properties in Flint and its surrounding area it has acquired
through tax foreclosure—seven other counties throughout the state
are now working to revitalize their communities through their own
land bank authorities.134
For more information: www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-34176---
,00.html
The Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund/Clean Ohio 
Assistance Fund
In November 2000, Ohio voters approved a ballot referendum tocreate the $400 million Clean Ohio Fund to fund the preservation
of the state’s farmland and natural areas, as well as to convert urban
brownfields to productive use.The Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund
and Clean Ohio Assistance Fund represent half of this initiative, allow-
ing the state to invest up to $200 million for activities involving the
evaluation, clean up, and redevelopment of the state’s many vacant
and underutilized brownfields sites. Local governments, port authori-
ties, and conservancy districts, as well as nonprofit or for-profit groups
working in cooperation with a governmental entity, can apply for the
funds each year.The Clean Ohio Council, chaired by the director of
the Ohio Department of Development, selects the strongest projects
based on the potential economic benefits, environmental improve-
ments, and benefits to low-income and minority communities, as well
as the amount and type of investment the applicant is providing.135
Advocates say that, since its inception, the Fund has helped advance
cleanups at 126 abandoned and polluted sites.136
For more information: www.clean.ohio.gov/
Grow the Middle Class
Improving the economies of older industrial cities
necessarily means improving the overall incomes of
the families who live there. One way to do this is to
make these cities more attractive to higher income
residents by improving schools, upgrading amenities,
and growing high end jobs. But this isn’t enough.
Older industrial cities cannot get ahead without
working to alleviate poverty and increase the opportu-
nities and wealth of their existing residents—without,
in other words, growing the middle class from within.
To this end, states must work with cities to improve
the vocational skills of residents, ensure that workers
take more money home at the end of the day, and
reduce the high cost burdens suffered by families liv-
ing in poor neighborhoods.
T
H
E
 B
R
O
O
K
IN
G
S
 I
N
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
 M
E
T
R
O
P
O
L
IT
A
N
 P
O
L
IC
Y
 P
R
O
G
R
A
M
V
.
A
 S
T
A
T
E
 A
G
E
N
D
A
 F
O
R
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
54
Give residents the skills and connections
they need to compete
Growing a robust middle class in older industrial
cities first and foremost requires that low-income res-
idents, including many recently-arrived immigrants,
have the education and skills needed to attain and
keep quality employment. This begins with high-per-
forming K–12 schools. But it also requires the devel-
opment of state-of-the-art workforce systems that
offer job training programs that align with local
industry needs, as well as provide direct connections
to regional job opportunities. 
The 1998 federal Workforce Investment Act (WIA)
has spurred states to streamline and enhance their
workforce delivery systems. These efforts should be
expanded to better serve the needs of inner-city resi-
dents. First, states should team up with local govern-
ments and nonprofits to design and fund programs to
teach new and hard-to-employ workers—young adults,
new immigrants, the chronically un- or under-
employed—the basic skills needed to survive in the
workplace. These can range from classes on use of
basic computer software programs to Vocational
English as a Second Language instruction to sessions
focused on “soft” skills like problem solving and cus-
tomer service. States should also provide targeted
resources to all types of post-secondary institutions—
including vocational and technical schools, commu-
nity colleges, and four-year universities—to create or
expand programs to help inner-city workers develop
the “hard” skills required for jobs in growing sectors
such as health care, or in specific regional industry
clusters. These programs should be designed in close
and on-going collaboration with industry leaders, busi-
ness groups, and private sector intermediaries and
should include internship, apprenticeship, and net-
working opportunities that can help students make
direct connections with potential employers both
within the city and throughout the wider metropolitan
area. Finally, states should invest directly in the cre-
ation and growth of workforce intermediaries—as
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California have done—that
can help low-income workers establish career path-
ways to good jobs, and help businesses access the job-
ready employees they need to succeed.137
Ohio Career Pathways Project
Growing out of the need to break down the disconnectbetween the state’s labor markets and its community colleges
and technical schools, in 2005 Ohio policymakers began collaborating
with the KnowledgeWorks Foundation to develop the Ohio Career
Pathways Project. KnowledgeWorks initially launched the project with
the establishment of three intermediary-led partnerships charged
with helping unemployed and low-wage workers advance their
careers; later that year the Governor’s Workforce Policy Board com-
mitted an additional $300,000 a year for three years to create three
additional partnerships. Each of the six partnerships—two of which
are managed by local workforce development agencies and four of
which are managed by postsecondary institutions—include workforce
development system representatives, adult basic education programs,
technical schools, employers, social service providers, and government
agencies, ensuring a system-wide approach to postsecondary work-
force education. Funding is used for operational costs and for techni-
cal assistance and capacity building for the partnerships, including
training for program coordinators and team members.138 While still a
nascent effort, the hope is that the Career Pathways intermediaries
will help increase the postsecondary educational attainment levels of
low-income workers, and ultimately help them enter higher-skilled,
higher-wage occupations.
For more information: www.kwfdn.org/adult_learning/career_pathways/
Make work pay for low-income workers 
The ability of many city residents to move out of
poverty requires not only that they are able to access
good jobs, but that they are supported by programs
that help them keep more of what they earn. But
because a growing number of low-income families
include full-time workers, the old “welfare office”
model for providing such support is more out of date
than ever.139
States can do their part to help these families, in a
few key ways. To begin with, all states should follow
the lead of the 19 states that have enacted their own
version of the federal Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). According to the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, a family of four earning $14,600 per
year falls about $276 below the federal poverty line,
even with the federal EITC. A state EITC equal to 
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15 percent of the federal EITC would bring the fam-
ily’s income above the poverty line.140
States should also take steps to streamline access
to key public supports for workers and their children.
First, they can adopt more flexible policies and 
procedures for working families to receive key state-
administered benefits, such as nutritional supports,
child care assistance, and subsidized health insur-
ance. These may include: reducing onerous income
and asset verification requirements; coordinating
renewal periods and processes across benefit pro-
grams; permitting families to apply for programs over
the phone, online, or by mail; and sharing a family’s
information from one program to update 
eligibility in other programs. Some Ohio counties, 
for example, allow families applying for child care
subsidies to apply for Medicaid on the same form.141
Second, states can provide modest support to non-
profit organizations that facilitate access to key bene-
fits for working families. Many such organizations
began by conducting outreach to families eligible for
federal tax credits like the EITC, but have now
extended their efforts to include outreach, screening,
and application for other work-support programs.142
For instance, Pennsylvania (along with the City of
Philadelphia) has provided financial support to
Philadelphia’s Campaign for Working Families, a col-
laborative of 17 organizations that provides free tax
preparation and access to the EITC, other tax credits,
public benefits, and asset-building resources.143
Reduce the costs of being poor in 
urban areas
A final step toward building a middle class in older
industrial cities is to reduce the high cost of living
that so many low-income families shoulder. In 2005,
nearly 4.2 million low-income households nationwide
paid higher than average prices for their mortgage,
about 4.5 million paid more for their auto loans, and
at least 1.6 million paid too much for basic goods like
furniture and appliances. These disparities are partic-
ularly acute in many inner-city neighborhoods, and
can add up to hundreds, sometimes thousands, of
dollars for low income families.144
States can play a major role in bringing down
urban families’ out-of-pocket expenses, freeing up
money for investments in wealth-growing assets, such
as education and homes.145 In the first place, state
leaders need to crack down on the unscrupulous
business practices of mortgage lenders, check cash-
ers, auto dealers, and others that drive up prices for
the poor. Efforts could include, for example, capping
the interest rates and fees set by payday lenders, as
over a dozen states have done, and placing restric-
tions on mortgage prepayment penalties and preda-
tory refinancing practices, as New Mexico and North
Carolina have done. States can also target the
demand side of the problem by helping low-income
residents make decisions that are in their best finan-
cial interest. Illinois and Georgia, for instance, are
among a number of states that now require a finan-
cial literacy class as a graduation requirement for
high school students.146
North Carolina’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law
In 1999, North Carolina enacted one of the most potent anti-predatory lending laws in the country.While numerous other
states have enacted statutes to guard against high-cost mortgage
lending, North Carolina’s is one of the few that targets abusive refi-
nancing practices. Among other things, the law prohibits prepayment
penalties on first-lien mortgages under $150,000; establishes a defini-
tion of high-cost loans; bars numerous lending practices without con-
sideration of a borrower’s ability to pay; prohibits refinancing if there
is no net benefit to the homeowner; and requires applicants for high-
cost loans to receive financial counseling before signing on the loan.
According to research conducted at the University of North Carolina,
from 1998 to 2000—after the law had taken affect—the state saw 
a substantial decline in the number of refinance originations, almost 
90 percent of which was due to a reduction in loans with abusive or
predatory terms.147
For more information: www.responsiblelending.org/ 
Create Neighborhoods 
of Choice
It is now well understood that neighborhoods of con-
centrated poverty—high numbers of which are
located in older industrial cities—exact significant
costs on families, particularly children. Residents of
these neighborhoods are more isolated from jobs, are
further removed from social networks, perform worse
in school, and have greater numbers of health prob-
lems than those in more mixed-income communities.
These neighborhoods are also costly for cities, in
terms of both the high service demands, and the lost
opportunities, they engender. State leaders need to
focus on developing housing and redevelopment poli-
cies aimed at turning deprived areas where those with
few options are consigned to live, into high-quality
communities where people of varying incomes want
to live. They must also work to preserve neighbor-
hoods before widespread decline sets in. 
Support mixed-income housing
Over the past several decades, a wide range of fed-
eral, state, and local policies and practices have been
designed to combat the well-documented ills associ-
ated with concentrated poverty. Among other goals,
these programs have sought to expand the availability
of affordable, quality housing in distressed urban
neighborhoods. But while these neighborhood
improvement efforts deserve accolades for helping to
bring some investment into long forgotten communi-
ties, they have not done a very good job of facilitating
the creation of mixed-income developments.148
Affordable housing options in wealthier urban and
suburban neighborhoods, meanwhile, remain limited
in many areas. 
As neighborhood services and amenities improve,
they naturally become more appealing to higher
income residents who have options in choosing
where to live; these residents in turn help create the
market for more growth. But states can move this
process along by encouraging the construction of
more market-rate housing in inner-city neighbor-
hoods. For instance, several states, including Indiana
and Massachusetts, now give preference in the allo-
cation of their Low Income Housing Tax Credits
(LIHTC) to developments that include market-rate
units.149 Such preference can be even more effective
if new LIHTC developments are required to be part
of a wider strategy for neighborhood revitalization. 
Creating mixed-income housing isn’t just about
attracting wealthier residents to low-income urban
areas, but also requires that poor residents have
housing opportunities in higher income neighbor-
hoods regionwide. To this end, states need to evalu-
ate where LIHTC developments are located
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throughout metropolitan areas, and ensure that they
are being equitably distributed across communities of
varying incomes. States should also encourage the
implementation of local inclusionary-zoning statutes
to boost the supply of affordable housing units being
built in wealthier communities.150
Grow inner-city markets
Nationwide, low-income households collectively have
about $655 billion in buying power, the vast majority
of which is spent on basic necessities such as food,
housing, and transportation.151 But traditional
income-based market analyses—which typically
underestimate the incomes of poor families, and dis-
regard residential density—tend to discount the mar-
ket potential in many inner-city communities. The
upshot is that these communities are often over-
looked by mainstream businesses, and thus lack
many of the high-quality, lower priced goods and
services enjoyed by wealthier areas. 
State leaders need to work with cities and the pri-
vate sector to help struggling neighborhoods attract
the retail, restaurants, banks, and other local-serving
businesses that prospective residents seek and exist-
ing households desperately need. As a first step,
states should appropriate resources to help localities
collect, maintain, and promote more accurate infor-
mation about neighborhood market potential through
the use of innovative data collection, mapping, and
other tools. They should then go further to provide
revolving loan funds and other financing mechanisms
to directly support local efforts to attract supermar-
kets and other retailers to underserved areas, under-
standing that such seed money can go a long way in
helping cities acquire and assemble land, fill in
financing gaps, or make vital infrastructure upgrades
and traffic improvements. Finally, states should look
for ways to creatively use existing resources to jump-
start local markets. For instance, New York is employ-
ing its substantial depository power to encourage
mainstream financial institutions to enter poor neigh-
borhoods that can’t attract them on their own, essen-
tially subsidizing these banks by providing both
below-market and market rate deposits. 
New York State Banking Development Districts
Fearing that they can’t attract enough retail deposits to maketheir business activities worthwhile, banks often avoid locating in
underserved urban neighborhoods.To overcome this problem, in
1998 New York State created the Banking Development District
(BDD) Program, which provides a range of incentives to banks to
open branches in neighborhoods with demonstrated need for finan-
cial services. Under the program, the state agrees to deposit state
funds into banks that expand services and locate in designated
Banking Development Districts; the state also provides access to
below-market public funds, real property tax breaks, and other local
tax incentives. In doing so, the state aims to expand consumer access
to mainstream banking, provide enhanced access to capital for local
businesses, and ultimately help stimulate economic development in
designated communities. As of October 2006, 31 BDDs had been
approved for official designation by the state, and its success has 
made it a national model for other states looking to establish 
similar programs.
For more information: www.banking.state.ny.us/bdd.htm 
Invest in preservation and rehabilitation
The history of older industrial city neighborhoods is
embedded in their rich stock of distinctive housing
and streetscapes. But decades of population and busi-
ness loss have decimated the former vitality of many
communities, and have left others struggling to
remain stable in the face of continued market
decline. These latter “transitioning” neighborhoods
can get caught in a blind spot where they are too
well-off to qualify for many public sector community
development programs, yet too run down to attract
new investment. 
States can help local governments and nonprofits
preserve these urban communities, in a number of
ways. In the first place, state leaders should help pre-
vent housing abandonment through homeownership
counseling programs, and emergency loan, anti-fraud,
and other laws and tools designed to prevent mort-
gage foreclosure and keep families in their homes. In
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order to help reduce Ohio’s very high foreclosure
rates, for instance, Governor Strickland recently cre-
ated a Foreclosure Prevention Task Force that is
tasked with designing a set of foreclosure prevention
and intervention strategies to assist homeowners with
distressed mortgages; the state is also offering a new
refinancing program that will make available an
affordable, fixed-rate financing alternative to home-
owners with mortgage loans that are inappropriate for
their financial circumstances.152
Second, states should actively encourage the
preservation and rehabilitation of aging homes and
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Transitioning neighborhoods can get
caught in a blind spot where they are
too well-off to qualify for many public
sector community development 
programs, yet too run down to attract
new investment.
Newark, New Jersey: Fixing the Basics for Higher Returns
Like many cities in the Northeast and Midwest, Newark is stillstruggling to overcome the legacy of dramatic industrial decline.
Though located in one of the wealthiest states in the nation, Newark’s
total employment fell nearly 4 percent during the 1990s, and in 2000
over 28 percent of all residents lived below the poverty line—more
than double the national average.157 The city also lost a third of its
population in the last four decades.158
In July 2006, a new administration, headed by Mayor Cory Booker,
took office and found that Newark’s government had accumulated a
severe structural deficit. From FY2003 to FY 2007, city recurring rev-
enues climbed by less than 10 percent, while spending on city police,
fire, and other services increased by 55 percent.The end result is a
$115.2 million structural budget deficit for FY 2007, and projected
gaps of $138.3 million and $186.0 million in FY 2008 and FY2009,
respectively.
To head off a financial crisis, the Booker administration and the City
Council are putting in place a number of new strategies designed to
make government operate more effectively, and to build confidence in
the city’s performance with the public, credit and bond rating agen-
cies, and the state.These efforts include reorganizing and streamlining
city departments, using technology to spur productivity, negotiating
more favorable labor contracts, improving budget practices, and
implementing sound, transparent financial management polices.
While these undertakings are essential to getting the city’s financial
house in order and putting it on the road to economic recovery, they
can only do so much.The state, too, has a vital role to play in helping
Newark and other economically distressed cities in New Jersey over-
come their fiscal challenges, not by presenting an open checkbook—
the state government has financial challenges of its own—but by
targeting existing investments more strategically, and revamping laws
and policies that hamper redevelopment.
This case study focuses on just one example of how state reform
could help inject new revenue into its older industrial cities, revenue
that could in turn be used to help families and grow their economies.
The study looks specifically at how New Jersey could better enable its
local governments, particularly Newark, to generate more own-source
revenues through three innovative measures. It then demonstrates
just one way Newark could utilize the additional revenues from these
reforms—by improving job training opportunities for low-income and
displaced workers—and the positive economic impact this could have
on the city (and ultimately the state) as a whole.
Fixing the Basics: State Authorization of New Local
Government Revenue Streams
The state of New Jersey has already targeted much-needed financial
assistance to the city of Newark. In FY2007 alone the state is provid-
ing $174.3 million in direct assistance to the city through grants and
state aid, $730.1 million in funding to the Newark Public Schools, and
millions more in funding for health, human services, and other services
provided through Essex County. State-supported investments in the
New Jersey Performing Arts Center and infrastructure for riverfront
development are also helping to stimulate downtown revitalization.
commercial areas. For example, all states should fol-
low the lead of New Jersey, Maryland, and others that
have adopted new building codes that encourage the
rehabilitation of existing structures by allowing
greater flexibility in construction standards without
compromising basic safety.153 State leaders should
also pass legislation authorizing state historic tax
credit programs—as 24 states have already done—
that give credits to homeowners or developers who
restore historically significant properties, many of
which are located in urban neighborhoods.154 Finally,
states should create programs that provide low-inter-
est loans and small grant funds to help low-income
homeowners and small business owners make neces-
sary repairs, upgrades, and other physical improve-
ments. Such programs can be a relatively inexpensive
way to both improve the quality and livability of dete-
riorating properties, as well as enhance the aesthetics
of urban neighborhoods. 
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As important as these investments are, the state can do more to
promote the city’s fiscal stability, and ultimately help it to create a
more competitive cost climate for business and residents. By allowing
Newark, and all municipalities in New Jersey, more autonomy in the
taxes and charges they levy, the state will be able to promote
Newark’s recovery without decreasing the amount of revenue the
state collects or increasing its intergovernmental aid to municipalities.
Below are three potential revenue sources that are directly applicable
to Newark and also have varying degrees of applicability to other
municipalities in New Jersey.
Urban Enterprise Zone Opt Out. New Jersey’s Urban
Enterprise Program was created in 1983 to encourage retail activity in
distressed urban areas. Under the program, a city that met certain cri-
teria for economic distress would have a portion of its major indus-
trial and commercial areas declared an Urban Enterprise Zone (UEZ)
by the state. Qualified businesses within each zone would be able to
decrease the state sales tax they charged on purchases by 50 percent,
and a portion of the sales tax revenue generated by these UEZ busi-
nesses would then be reinvested into the city. In 1984, Newark
became one of the original 10 municipalities to have a designated
UEZ in the state.
After over two decades, however, the impact of the UEZ program
on Newark’s commercial health seems questionable at best: Studies
have shown, in fact, that on a local level the lower tax rate and subsi-
dies offered by UEZ programs have not tended to affect business
location decisions.Yet the state has extended Newark’s (and other
cities’) UEZ designations beyond the initial 20 year designation period.
In light of the program’s limited success in Newark and across the
state, New Jersey should allow UEZs to opt out of the program
either in whole or in part. By doing so, sales tax in those areas would
increase from the current rate of 3.5 percent to the normal state rate
of 7 percent.The catch? In exchange for opting out of the program,
the city would be able to retain the revenue generated from the
additional 3.5 percent sales tax in the UEZ area for a designated
number of years. Under this scenario, the state is not ceding revenue
to the city since this revenue is currently not being collected by the
state.159 The fiscal impact of implementing this “opt out” option has yet
to be determined.
Personal Property Tax on Containers. The city of Newark is
also home to Port Newark. Operated by the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, the port is a part of the largest and most com-
prehensive collection of maritime cargo handling facilities on the east
coast of North America.160
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey currently has an
import-export ratio of 2.6, meaning that, in 2005 alone, over 1.4 mil-
lion more 20-foot equivalent containers (TEUs) were taken into its
ports than were shipped out.161 Some of the containers coming into
Port Newark are transported away from the port by rail or shipped
from the port empty of goods. However, given the high cost of trans-
porting empty containers, large numbers of empties are stored in the
area surrounding port for indefinite periods of time.This long-term
storage causes blight along the port area of the city, discourages
(continued on page 60)
Rhode Island Historic Tax Credit Program
Instituted in 2002, Rhode Island’s historic tax credit program hasbeen widely credited for boosting a new wave of rebuilding and
revitalization of urban neighborhoods.Through the program, home-
owners of historic properties can earn state income tax credits equal
to 20 percent of the cost of exterior restoration work and owners of
historic commercial properties can earn a credit of 30 percent of
qualified rehabilitation expenditures.The program, which is adminis-
tered by the Rhode Island Historical Preservation and Heritage
Commission, has not only helped return properties to the tax rolls,
but it has also succeeded in improving public safety and generating
new jobs and housing in areas where opportunities did not exist pre-
viously, bringing the promise of renewed economic vitality in those
communities. One Grow Smart Rhode Island study found that the
return on one dollar of state commercial tax credit investment is
$5.47 in total economic output; a separate analysis by the group 
estimated that 75 percent of all tax credit projects and 83 percent of
the investment stimulated by the program occurred in economically
disadvantaged neighborhoods with low- and moderate- family
incomes.155
For more information: www.preservation.ri.gov/credits/
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development in the area, and depresses potential property tax rev-
enues by lowering property values of land used by and adjacent to
storage areas. By imposing a personal property tax of $5 per day for
every TEU stored within the city of Newark, the city would generate
an estimated $18.3 million annually for every 10,000 TEUs stored
within the city limits to offset those impacts and potentially discour-
age future container storage growth.162 Due to the inelasticity of stor-
ing port containers, and the prominence of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, minimal harm to the port’s business is
assumed.
Local Rental Car Tax. Newark Liberty International is the
country’s 13th busiest commercial airport.163 In 2006, 35.7 million pas-
sengers passed through the airport; of these, about 11 percent used a
rental car service at the Airport.164 Yet among comparable interna-
tional airports within 200 miles of Newark, Newark has one of the
lowest rental car tax and fee structures.165
The state should enable the city to enact a rental car tax that
could then be utilized to help maintain the infrastructure used by
rental cars, a practice common in neighboring airports and across the
U.S. Due to the ubiquity of rental car taxes, as well as Newark’s cur-
rently low comparable rental car tax burden, Newark airport travelers
can likely accept a modest increase in rental car tax rates with mini-
mal impact on rental car activity. By imposing a rental car tax ranging
between $1 and $5 per day, the city would be able to generate
between $11.7 million and $58.5 million annually.
Fixing the Basics:The Impact 
Under New Jersey state law, all municipalities are mandated to
increase property taxes in order to pass a balanced budget.The $30
million to $76.8 million generated by the revenue streams outlined
above would make it possible for Newark to avoid raising property
taxes, saving the average Newark family between $700 and $1,900.
These revenues, combined with the savings expected from the
Booker administration strategies discussed above, could help close the
city’s budget gaps, in a manner far less corrosive than sweeping prop-
erty tax increases.
Once fiscal balance is achieved, there would be many uses for this
revenue—from much-needed investment in infrastructure to public
safety to workforce training—that would have a direct impact on the
city and its economy.
Take workforce training as an example of one such use. If Newark
leaders applied $10 million of new revenues toward a workforce
training program focusing on low-income and displaced workers, how
would the community benefit over the near-term? A number of stud-
ies have highlighted the positive earnings differential resulting from
publicly-funded workforce training. All else being equal, higher earnings
translate into more economic activity, as consumers have greater
resources to purchase a wide range of goods and services.This in
turn leads to more businesses and more jobs, extending the eco-
nomic benefits even further.
(continued from pqge 59)
Newark, New Jersey: Fixing the Basics for Higher Returns 
This agenda demonstrates that there is much states
can—and need—do to reinvigorate the economies of
older industrial cities. But not only do states have the
power to help energize cities’ revitalization, they also
have a strong—if largely unrecognized—rationale to
do so. 
Older industrial cities contain billions of dollars of
state investments in urban infrastructure such as
roads, transit, sewer and water systems, and public
facilities. State funding for urban school systems,
community colleges, and public universities makes up
a large and growing portion of state budgets. And
states invest substantially—year in, year out—in the
low- and moderate-income families who live in these
communities, through a variety of programs like
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), and State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP). Yet for all this, most state govern-
ments have paid little attention as to how much, and
to what end, they are spending on cities and their
residents, and how they could be getting far more
bang for their buck. Instead, they’ve operated under a
sort of “woe is them” mentality, seeing cities as fiscal
drains on the state budget, rather than as potential
investment opportunities. States, in short, have fol-
lowed the market in older industrial cities, rather
than working to catalyze it—a rational fiscal choice
20 years ago, perhaps, but one that desperately needs
to change. 
The above agenda offers a new approach to state
urban policy, one designed not just to cope with city
problems but to stimulate city recovery. If carried out,
the potential returns—for families, for surrounding
suburbs, for the environment, and ultimately, then,
for the state as a whole—could be immense.
In the first place, investing in the revitalization of
older industrial cities will have an enormous effect 
on the low- and moderate-income urban households
who have “stuck it out” in these cities—whether by
choice or a lack of other options—even as the cities
continued deteriorate around them. While policies
and programs aimed at growing the middle class are
obviously designed to benefit families directly,
improvements in the overall economies of older
industrial cities will also flow back to them through a
virtuous cycle of growth and development that fosters
the creation of more and better jobs, the stabilization
of deteriorating neighborhoods, rising home values,
better public school performance, the increased avail-
ability of private sector retail, greater public safety,
improved municipal services, and an overall enhance-
ment in the quality of city life. This isn’t just wishful
thinking: Recent studies have demonstrated that,
despite many of the fears associated with the gentrifi-
cation of urban neighborhoods, low-income residents
do indeed reap benefits from their revitalization, and
are about as likely to remain in gentrifying communi-
ties—or possibly even more so—than those living in
other neighborhoods.156 Cities must make sure that
they “get out in front” of revitalization so that the
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For example, if Newark used its funds on adult workforce training
programs similar to those funded by the federal Workforce
Investment Act (WIA), the region would see higher employee earn-
ings and greater overall economic activity. Using statewide WIA 
estimates as a gauge, $10 million would allow Newark to train
approximately 1,600 residents, who would go on to earn approxi-
mately $6,000 more per year after receiving training—yielding a grand
total of $9.7 million in additional worker earnings.166 Factor in the “rip-
ple effect” such income generates, and this $10 million investment
would also generate approximately $6.2 million in additional regional
earnings and 226 jobs per year.167 Given that tax revenues are largely
a function of economic activity, both the city and state governments
would reap substantial fiscal benefits, as well—benefits that would 
ultimately flow back to the state’s businesses and residents.
State authorization of an expanded local revenue base, imple-
mented at the city’s option, would not absolve Newark’s elected 
leaders from the need to make difficult choices and take responsibility
for the results of their actions. But such state action would provide
Newark with a fighting chance to renew itself in an image the city’s
leaders are working so hard to make real.
Source:The PFM Group and TXP168
benefits actually do accrue to—rather than simply
displace—the majority of existing residents. But for
cities so long on the decline, the need to manage
economic growth and development—and the new
revenues such growth generates—is surely a good
problem to have. 
Restoring the economies of older industrial cities
will also have an impact beyond their borders. Given
that over 70 percent of older industrial cities are
located in economically “weak” metropolitan areas,
it’s apparent that the fates of cities and their suburbs
are closely tied. While it is as yet unclear if the eco-
nomic fortune of one actually drives that of the other,
researchers have increasingly demonstrated the
“interdependence” between the two, and the likeli-
hood of substantial negative and positive “spillover”
effects from one to the other.169 Myron Orfield, for
example, has shown that problems once confined to
central cities, such as crime, unemployment, and tax-
base erosion, eventually undercut the stability of the
suburbs.170 Analyses by Richard Voith, H.V. Savitch
and colleagues, and Larry Ledebur and William
Barnes have all associated central city decline and
wide urban-suburban prosperity gaps with regional
stagnation, as measured by slowed income growth;
Voith also found in a separate study that city employ-
ment growth has a positive impact on suburban hous-
ing prices.171 Recent research by Hill and
Brennan, finally, has demonstrated
a strong correlation between city
and suburban job growth, indicating
that the market for business location
is regional in scope.172 Together, these
studies make a strong case for why
suburbs need to care about their cities—and how
over the long run they, too, will reap the benefits of
policies and programs targeted at city revitalization. 
Finally, investments in older industrial cities will
have an enormous environmental payoff, improving
the attractiveness of these communities for residents
and businesses and giving them
an opportunity to capture a
greater share of regional growth.
This in turn helps make more
efficient use of already urban-
ized land and existing infrastruc-
ture, curbs sprawl, conserves
woodlands and open space,
facilitates the use of public tran-
sit (in turn decreasing automo-
bile use), decreases harmful emissions, and reduces
the overall energy needed to heat and cool homes and
offices. The hard evidence of these benefits is mount-
ing: A recent study by researchers at the Sierra Club
and U.S. Green Building Council on the energy effi-
ciency of high-density urbanism versus energy effi-
cient home design suggests that even a moderately
dense development of 12 housing units per acre pro-
vides significantly higher energy savings than the max-
imum savings accrued through energy efficient home
design at current levels of density. The study also
found that an average urban household uses just 320
million BTUs of energy annually, 120 million BTUs
less than the average suburban household.173 As con-
cerns over the economic and environmental impacts
of global climate change continue to escalate, invest-
ment in cities might very well become a central part
of the national discourse on solutions. State leaders
ought to be at the forefront of that discussion. 
At the end of the day, then, the widespread market
recovery of older industrial cities means a more eco-
nomically secure populace, stronger
metropolitan economies, and a more
efficient, environmentally prudent use
of existing land and resources—which
together add up to produce healthier,
wealthier, more competitive states.
Such returns, to be sure, would be
evidence of money well spent. ■
This agenda offers a new approach to state urban policy, one
designed not just to cope with city problems but to stimulate
city recovery. If enacted, the potential returns—for families, for
surrounding suburbs, for the environment, and ultimately, then,
for the state as a whole—could be immense.
T
H
E
 B
R
O
O
K
IN
G
S
 I
N
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
 M
E
T
R
O
P
O
L
IT
A
N
 P
O
L
IC
Y
 P
R
O
G
R
A
M
V
.
A
 S
T
A
T
E
 A
G
E
N
D
A
 F
O
R
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
62
R
E
S
T
O
R
IN
G
 P
R
O
S
P
E
R
IT
Y
:
T
H
E
 S
T
A
T
E
 R
O
L
E
 I
N
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
V
.
A
 S
T
A
T
E
 A
G
E
N
D
A
 F
O
R
 R
E
V
IT
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
’S
 O
L
D
E
R
 I
N
D
U
S
T
R
IA
L
 C
IT
IE
S
63
Revitalizing Industrial Cities:
What the U.S. Can Learn from Europe
Europe, like the United States, contains a collection of economi-cally distressed cities that emerged in large part as a result of
the swift economic transition from an industrial to a knowledge-based
economy. Recognizing this and other trends, the London School of
Economics is leading a parallel Weak Market Cities Programme to
examine and evaluate European cities demonstrating initial signs of
economic recovery.These cities are: Belfast, UK; Bilbao, Spain; Bremen,
Germany; Leipzig, Germany; Sheffield, UK; St. Etienne, France; and
Torino, Italy.
Some key gleanings from these European cities thus far include:
European national governments and the European
Union (EU) play a more central role in the economic
recovery of cities. Compared with U.S. cities, European cities
receive greater resources from their national governments to imple-
ment public investment projects such as housing, infrastructure, and
social programs. At the same time, the EU has codified the impor-
tance of urban areas into policy, allocating resources to support social
cohesion and physical reinvestment.
To further propel urban innovations, the EU funds city-networks,
facilitating the exchange of policy and practice ideas between
European cities.The EU has also launched a City of Culture project,
where a European Capital of Culture is selected each year (previous
years included Bologna, Helsinki, and Lille) to draw the people of
Europe together through a series of cultural activities and events.
While the EU currently funds up to 500,000 Euros, these funds
increased to €1.5 million beginning in 2007.174
Strong Mayors have propelled cities forward. Several
European cities reached a “turning point” in urban reform when
strong and credible mayors were elected into office.These mayors
successfully established a strong and unwavering vision for economic
reform; led strategic planning efforts deemed credible by the private
sector and future investors; and improved city governance by fixing
the basics.
“Pacing devises” can aid economic recovery. Because sus-
tained economic recovery takes a generation (20 to 25 years), the
Europeans have recognized that pacing devices are crucial tools for
creating momentum in the interim. Pacing devices, for example, could
be winning or attracting major national and international cultural
events.While they do not necessarily improve city economic per-
formance in their own right, pacing devices do give a visual and 
physical expression of economic progress.They are “marker posts”
along a long journey.
Geographic alliances can help spur economic growth.
Several European cities have established cross-regional partnerships,
with the goal of enhancing their greater regional economy. Physical
investments such as fast, convenient, and reliable transportation (rail,
air, port) and broadband networks are helping to facilitate connec-
tions between cities, while businesses and organizations work
together to fuel economic growth. In England, for example, the
national government funds nine Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs) to promote quality job growth and competitiveness in their
respective regions. RDAs also work with local partner organizations
to regenerate unused or run-down sites, improve the quality and
attractiveness of public spaces, and revitalize urban communities,
among other activities.175
Transformative investments are key to urban revitaliza-
tion. Europe is rife with examples of how transformative investments
are remaking their cities—from the transformation of Bilbao’s dock-
lands area with the iconic Guggenheim museum to Torino’s conver-
sion of the obsolete Fiat Lingotto factory into a convention and trade
show venue.
National governments, along with the EU, can be vital to these
efforts.To facilitate the transformation of its derelict brownfield sites,
for example, France founded EPORA (a public land agency) to pur-
chase these properties for future redevelopment. After purchase,
EPORA clears or redevelops the sites and prepares them for resale
to both private investors and the local municipality, often at 40 per-
cent of cost. EPORA has played a critical role in reinventing the land-
scape of Saint-Étienne’s urban area, including the state-owned GIAT
Industries manufacturing site. GIAT is now being transformed into a
“Design Village,” where design-related clusters will locate. EPORA is
funded by the EU, national government, local municipalities and a local
tax. Between 1999 and 2003, EPORA spent more than €65 million
on its operations, with the EU and national government providing
over 40 percent of these funds.176
Source: Julie Wagner, Brookings Institution Nonresident Senior Fellow
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Yet, for all their problems, there are good reasons
to be hopeful about older industrial cities’ future,
particularly given current and impending demo-
graphic, economic, and political trends. The above
policy agenda highlights the specific ways in which
state governments can help these communities take
advantage of this unique moment and begin to turn
their economies around. But this won’t be enough: In
order for a new urban policy agenda to have real
impact, local, regional, and state governments and
constituencies must be organized in such a way as to
effectively carry it out. Restoring prosperity in older
industrial cities, in short, means building the capacity
to make it happen. In practice, this means both
building the capacity of state
and local governments to more
effectively administer programs
and services, as well as building
the capacity of political, busi-
ness, and community leaders—
at the local, regional, and state
level—to create and sustain col-
VI. Organizing for
Success
W
ithout a doubt, America’s older industrial cities are
stuck in a tough spot.The brutal impacts of national
and international tendencies toward deindustrializa-
tion and decentralization, coupled with a largely
anti-urban policy environment, have over time 
decimated the economic health of these cities, limited their locational value for
investment, and degraded the opportunities available to many of their residents.
Such distress is evidenced by entrenched trends of slow employment, business, and
wage growth, as well as high poverty, pervasive joblessness, and lagging individual
and family incomes.
In order for a new urban policy agenda to have 
real impact, local, regional, and state governments and
constituencies must be organized in such a way as to
effectively carry it out.
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laborative, cross-sector networks within and across
existing municipal boundaries. 
At the local level, organizing for success first
demands that older industrial cities create a healthy
and receptive milieu in which businesses and fami-
lies can grow and thrive. To this end, local leaders
must make the competent, clean, transparent, and
effective administration of government operations
and services their highest priority. In short, this
means enhancing the way in which city officials and
departments interface with residents and busi-
nesses, improving how the day to
day “behind the scenes” work of gov-
ernment gets carried out, measuring
city performance over time, and
ensuring accountability when expecta-
tions aren’t met. The strategic applica-
tion of technology—e.g., advanced web
portals, electronic mapping, and tools
that facilitate the collection, manage-
ment, utilization, and sharing of data across agen-
cies—is essential to accomplishing each of these
objectives, yet older industrial cities often lack the
resources to acquire, implement, and effectively uti-
lize new systems. State support for local e-govern-
ment technology could go a long way in making
cities function better with smaller budgets—and
ultimately making them more desirable locations in
which to live and work. 
Organizing for success is not only about re-making
government; it’s also about re-making the civic infra-
structure vital to catalyzing and carrying through a
wide scale revitalization effort. The departure of
major employers and residents—and the concomitant
decline in the retail and service businesses that
served them—has left an enormous leadership breach
in many older industrial cities that is only just begin-
ning to be filled by key urban institutions such hospi-
tals and universities. Even in
communities that do have a more
active and engaged leadership class,
individual actors and organizations
often have their own parochial—if
worthy—interests based on particu-
lar issues, geographies, or simply
political caprice.177
Bringing about a real city ren-
aissance demands that local leaders come
together to build strong coalitions of innovative
thinkers and stakeholders with a variety of back-
grounds and viewpoints—but all working toward a
common goal. These “city builders” should include
major employers, business leaders, real estate devel-
opers, lenders and investors, university heads, trans-
portation officials, environmental advocates,
faith-based leaders, community organizations, and
government decision makers. Together, this group
needs to engage local residents in developing a com-
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petitive vision for their city, choose a few “big bets”
on which to target early efforts, and design a plan to
get things done. States can help, by finding ways to
incentivize local coordination and planning for large-
scale projects in which state resources are being 
utilized, and by making citizen participation in proj-
ect and program design a must. 
Collaboration must also be happening at the metro-
politan level, with city and suburban leaders aligning
together to boost regional competitiveness. Older
industrial cities, first-suburb
coalitions, regional workforce
alliances, and metropolitan 
planning organizations (MPOs)
are natural and critical allies 
in designing strategies around
economic and workforce 
development, infrastructure
planning, and other issues that
defy municipal boundaries.
Unfortunately, current state-imposed governance and
tax systems—as noted above—serve to encourage com-
petition rather than cooperation among jurisdictions,
undermining regional economic growth in the process. 
There are several ways that states might help
regional stakeholders take aim at the arbitrary barri-
Pennsylvania State Planning Board 
Pennsylvania provides a good model for making better regionalcooperation a reality. In 2004 Gov. Rendell revived the state’s
defunct Planning Board, which has since devised a series of recom-
mendations designed to promote the growth and competitiveness of
both urban and rural economies, and improve the quality of life in all
of Pennsylvania’s communities.The recommendations are focused on
right-sizing the provision of services such as police and fire, ensuring
consistency of planning and implementation, improving tax revenue
and tax base sharing options, and removing barriers to consolidations
and mergers of local governments when such steps are appropriate.
While not yet implemented, these recommendations are a major first
step in the state’s efforts to reform its local governance system.178
For more information: www.newpa.com/default.aspx?id=129 
Perhaps the best thing that states can do to encourage
regional cooperation is to simply get out of the way,
removing the legal and regulatory obstacles to 
consolidation, and letting entrepreneurial local entities
work or join together as they deem appropriate.
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ers that too often set cities and suburbs in opposition
to one another, and instead work toward bolstering
opportunities in, and the marketability of, their
regions as a whole. For instance,
states could create a system of
incentives for local entities to
collaborate, offering grant funds
to jurisdictions that consolidate
or share functions and services
such as police and fire protec-
tion, or giving bonus points to
grant applications jointly pre-
pared by neighboring municipalities. They could also
actively utilize regional organizations such as MPOs
or councils of governments to implement state pro-
grams, or, at the bold end of the spectrum, actually
empower county governments to take over those func-
tions—such as transportation or economic develop-
ment—that are clearly more regional in scope.
Perhaps the best thing that states can do to encourage
regional cooperation is to simply get out of the way,
removing the legal and regulatory obstacles to consoli-
dation, and letting entrepreneurial local entities work
or join together as they deem appropriate. 
Finally, the revitalization of older industrial cities
will require better organizing at the state level as
well. State governments, for their part, need not only
to engage in specific policy reforms aimed at improv-
ing urban economies, but also look for ways to reor-
ganize their programmatic initiatives and agencies so
they can be more effective for the families and com-
munities they are designed to serve. At a broad level,
this might mean both consolidating certain pro-
grams—such as workforce and economic develop-
ment—where there are clear synergies in function
and mission, and finding ways to better coordinate
efforts across disparate programs and agencies—
education and housing, for example—where there 
are vital, if often overlooked, intersection points.
More narrowly, it might mean creating more efficient
and effective ways for cities to work with state repre-
sentatives to better navigate the often complicated
labyrinth of state programs available to support a 
particular program or project. 
State-level organizing encompasses much more,
however. The state, by definition, is the municipali-
ties and citizens that comprise it. Yet although older
industrial cities and their core counties
represent a substantial constituency in sev-
eral states—almost 40 percent of the popu-
lation of Pennsylvania, 30 percent of the
population of Michigan, and over a third of
the population of Ohio—their interests
have not been well-represented at the state
level. If these communities want change,
then, the time has come to demand it. To
this end, urban leaders from across cities
and older suburbs must band together to
form robust statewide networks that can
advocate for a new state reform agenda 
like that presented here. In doing so, 
these communities will, at long last,
become a formidable force for state leaders
to reckon with. ■
Urban leaders from across cities and older suburbs must
band together to form robust statewide networks that
can advocate for a new state reform agenda like that 
presented here.
VII. Conclusion
A
fter decades of deterioration and decline, current economic
and demographic forces are providing fresh opportunities for
older industrial cities to capitalize on their assets, and restore
the prosperity that has for too long eluded so many of their
neighborhoods and families.
The revitalization and renewal of older industrial
cities demands a new approach to urban policy and
practice, however—at all levels: 
• States, for their part, need to reorient their poli-
cies and investments in these cities such that
their market recovery is the top priority. 
• Cities need to effectively organize so as to com-
mand the attention and concerted focus of state
leaders—and the confidence of private sector
investors. 
• And business leaders, citizens, community organi-
zations, and other stakeholders in cities, suburbs,
and rural areas need to hold government officials
accountable for ensuring that their tax dollars are
being used effectively to grow
robust, sustainable, and
inclusive regions—of which
healthy older industrial cities
are a vital part. 
Most importantly, all these actors need to work
together to set aspirational goals for city renewal,
gauge their progress over time, and continually adjust
their strategies to overcome new challenges, and
seize new opportunities, as they arise. 
Moving a real reform agenda for older industrial
cities will naturally be an organic, messy, and frus-
trating process that will demand the patience, flexi-
bility, and commitment of many diverse
constituencies. Success won’t come easy, it won’t
come soon, and it won’t come to every city. But given
the positive trends now afoot, there’s little excuse not
to try—and no better time to get started. ■
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Abilene TX -0.424 196 -0.278 193
Akron OH -0.57 217 -0.223 183
Albany GA -0.562 214 -1.242 283
Albany NY -0.829 260 -0.808 251
Albuquerque NM 0.12 109 0.419 95
Allentown PA -0.762 248 -0.464 215
Altoona PA -0.557 213 -0.751 245
Amarillo TX -0.036 135 0.203 118
Ames IA 0.187 105 0.192 119
Anaheim CA -0.331 180 0.371 101
Anchorage AK 0.001 129 1.507 10
Anderson IN -1.072 285 -0.201 180
Ann Arbor MI 0.047 119 0.875 43
Appleton WI 0.911 39 1.383 16
Arlington TX 0.66 57 1.256 18
Arlington VA -0.169 154 2.554 2
Asheville NC 0.36 82 -0.036 152
Athens-Clarke County GA 0.327 84 -0.898 260
Atlanta GA 0.727 49 -0.522 222
Augusta-Richmond County GA 0.566 67 -0.447 212
Aurora CO 1.621 17 1.161 26
Austin TX 2.904 3 0.978 35
Bakersfield CA -0.542 212 -0.154 175
Baltimore MD -1.178 293 -1.029 267
Baton Rouge LA -0.077 140 -0.593 230
Battle Creek MI -0.599 223 -0.052 156
Beaumont TX -0.679 235 -0.453 213
Bellingham WA 0.806 42 -0.359 206
Bend OR 2.42 6 0.829 46
Bethlehem PA -0.899 265 -0.235 187
Billings MT 0.367 81 0.5 83
Binghamton NY -1.53 301 -0.867 257
Birmingham AL -0.979 274 -1.16 277
Bismarck ND 0.2 101 0.982 34
Bloomington IL 0.485 73 1.428 12
Bloomington IN -0.003 131 -0.84 254
Boise ID 2.232 8 1.138 27
Boston MA 0.032 123 0.151 123
Boulder CO 2.481 5 0.88 42
Bridgeport CT -0.681 236 -0.608 234
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Brownsville TX 0.708 53 -2.274 302
Bryan TX 1.771 12 -0.291 195
Buffalo NY -1.115 288 -1.442 290
Canton OH -0.744 246 -0.621 236
Cape Coral FL 0.624 58 0.7 53
Carson City NV na na 0.46 89
Cedar Rapids IA 0.289 87 1.169 25
Champaign IL 0.015 128 -0.205 181
Charleston SC 0.197 102 0.02 141
Charleston WV -0.512 211 0.189 121
Charlotte NC 0.912 38 1.236 19
Chattanooga TN -0.098 143 -0.263 191
Cheyenne WY 0.136 108 0.628 62
Chicago IL -0.564 215 -0.34 202
Chico CA -0.19 158 -0.833 253
Cincinnati OH -0.85 263 -0.353 204
Clarksville TN 1.247 25 0.507 81
Cleveland OH -0.866 264 -1.374 288
College Station TX 1.066 30 -1.759 298
Colorado Springs CO 1.782 11 1.103 31
Columbia MO 0.72 50 0.135 127
Columbia SC -0.225 163 -0.437 210
Columbus GA -0.36 185 0.01 144
Columbus OH 0.033 122 0.605 68
Corpus Christi TX -0.266 173 -0.176 177
Dallas TX 0.064 118 0.208 117
Danbury CT -0.228 166 1.384 15
Danville VA -1.138 291 -0.928 263
Davenport IA -0.053 137 0.305 110
Dayton OH -1.064 283 -0.935 264
Daytona Beach FL -0.201 159 -1.094 273
Decatur AL -0.056 138 0.158 122
Decatur IL -0.933 269 -0.341 203
Deltona FL 0.94 35 0.347 106
Denver CO 0.238 91 0.637 60
Des Moines IA -0.214 161 0.509 79
Detroit MI -0.96 271 -1.509 292
Dothan AL 0.077 116 0.058 135
Dubuque IA -0.265 172 0.532 77
Duluth MN -0.13 148 -0.054 157
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Durham NC 1.054 31 0.588 72
Eau Claire WI 0.746 47 0.474 87
El Paso TX -0.169 153 -0.926 262
Elkhart IN -0.408 193 0.294 111
Erie PA -0.683 237 -0.657 239
Eugene OR 0.167 106 0.19 120
Evansville IN -0.449 202 0.008 145
Fairfield CA -0.128 147 0.821 47
Fall River MA -0.582 220 -0.514 220
Fargo ND 0.594 61 0.881 41
Fayetteville AR 1.509 19 -0.504 219
Fayetteville NC 0.088 115 -0.065 158
Flagstaff AZ 1.305 23 0.502 82
Flint MI -1.406 299 -1.352 287
Fort Collins CO 1.625 16 0.889 40
Fort Lauderdale FL 0.206 100 0.36 105
Fort Smith AR -0.247 170 0.015 143
Fort Wayne IN -0.491 209 0.369 103
Fort Worth TX 0.261 90 0.122 129
Fremont CA 0.582 64 2.43 4
Fresno CA -0.579 218 -1.091 272
Gainesville FL 0.023 126 -0.965 265
Glendale CA -0.769 249 0.62 65
Grand Rapids MI -0.251 171 0.111 131
Great Falls MT -0.399 191 -0.044 155
Greeley CO 1.324 21 0.018 142
Green Bay WI 0.223 96 0.673 56
Greensboro NC 0.23 93 0.633 61
Greenville NC 0.799 44 -0.555 225
Greenville SC 0.108 111 0.245 115
Gulfport MS 1.582 18 -0.181 178
Harrisburg PA -0.688 239 -0.87 258
Hartford CT -1.22 296 -1.967 300
Honolulu HI -1.134 290 0.582 73
Houston TX 0.031 124 -0.102 167
Huntington WV -0.702 242 -1.338 286
Huntsville AL 0.227 95 0.511 78
Idaho Falls ID 0.402 77 0.49 84
Indianapolis IN -0.13 149 0.679 55
Iowa City IA 0.72 51 0.363 104
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Irving TX 0.949 34 1.21 22
Jackson MS -0.817 256 -0.672 241
Jackson TN 0.781 45 -0.246 190
Jacksonville FL 0.105 112 0.597 70
Jacksonville NC 1.258 24 0.646 59
Janesville WI -0.025 134 1.125 29
Johnson City TN 0.583 63 -0.027 150
Jonesboro AR 0.495 71 -0.02 148
Kalamazoo MI -0.685 238 -0.763 248
Kansas City MO -0.581 219 0.332 108
Kennewick WA 0.984 33 0.486 85
Killeen TX 0.915 37 0.336 107
Knoxville TN -0.118 144 -0.495 218
La Crosse WI -0.371 186 0.027 139
Lafayette IN 0.413 76 0.578 74
Lafayette LA 0.672 56 0.052 136
Lake Charles LA 0.069 117 -0.598 231
Lakeland FL -0.226 164 -0.318 199
Lancaster PA -0.631 230 -0.629 237
Lansing MI -0.812 255 0.137 126
Laredo TX 1.694 14 -1.537 293
Las Cruces NM 0.876 41 -0.757 246
Las Vegas NV 2.592 4 0.447 93
Lawrence KS 0.925 36 0.31 109
Lawton OK -0.007 132 -0.091 165
Lexington-Fayette KY -0.125 146 0.755 51
Lincoln NE 0.5 69 1.023 32
Little Rock AR -0.083 141 0.46 90
Long Beach CA -1.13 289 -0.459 214
Longview TX -0.416 195 -0.183 179
Los Angeles CA -1.01 277 -0.423 209
Louisville KY -0.392 190 -0.536 223
Lubbock TX -0.278 176 -0.12 169
Lynchburg VA -0.377 189 -0.245 189
Macon GA -0.734 245 -1.181 278
Madison WI 0.399 78 0.924 38
Manchester NH -0.339 181 0.852 44
Mansfield OH -0.82 257 -0.398 208
McAllen TX 1.315 22 -0.876 259
Medford OR 0.61 60 0.035 138
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Melbourne FL -0.118 145 0.073 134
Memphis TN -0.175 155 -0.444 211
Merced CA -0.62 229 -1.498 291
Mesa AZ 1.484 20 0.683 54
Miami FL -0.822 258 -1.777 299
Midland TX -0.29 177 0.42 94
Milwaukee WI -0.972 272 -0.576 229
Minneapolis MN 0.093 114 0.61 67
Missoula MT 1.129 28 -0.129 171
Mobile AL -0.429 198 -0.617 235
Modesto CA -0.468 205 -0.275 192
Monroe LA -0.092 142 -1.537 294
Montgomery AL -0.142 151 -0.091 164
Muncie IN -0.782 250 -0.913 261
Napa CA 0.221 97 0.983 33
Nashua NH -0.275 175 1.479 11
Nashville-Davidson TN -0.002 130 0.589 71
New Bedford MA -0.669 232 -0.863 256
New Haven CT -1.08 287 -1.224 281
New Orleans LA -0.979 273 -1.109 274
New York NY -0.213 160 -0.393 207
Newark NJ -1.025 278 -2.044 301
Newport News VA -0.824 259 0.371 100
Norfolk VA -1.075 286 -0.155 176
North Charleston SC 0.735 48 -0.745 244
Norwalk CT -0.373 188 1.9 7
Oakland CA 0.111 110 -0.067 160
Odessa TX -0.928 268 -0.476 217
Ogden UT 0.804 43 -0.223 184
Oklahoma City OK -0.16 152 0.145 124
Omaha NE 0.234 92 0.811 48
Ontario CA 0.3 86 -0.224 185
Orem UT 2.31 7 0.795 49
Orlando FL 0.524 68 0.448 92
Oshkosh WI -0.674 234 0.473 88
Owensboro KY -0.497 210 -0.208 182
Oxnard CA -0.233 169 0.094 133
Palm Bay FL -0.372 187 0.243 116
Paradise NV 3.891 2 0.482 86
Pensacola FL -0.462 204 -0.026 149
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Peoria IL -0.469 206 -0.1 166
Philadelphia PA -1.211 295 -1.077 270
Phoenix AZ 1.192 27 0.382 97
Pine Bluff AR -0.909 266 -1.332 285
Pittsburgh PA -0.812 254 -0.768 250
Plano TX 5.219 1 2.966 1
Pocatello ID 0.213 98 0.13 128
Port Arthur TX -0.567 216 -1.668 297
Port St. Lucie FL 0.685 55 0.376 98
Portland ME 0.044 120 0.612 66
Portland OR 0.212 99 0.602 69
Providence RI -0.911 267 -1.228 282
Provo UT 2.072 9 -0.538 224
Pueblo CO 0.228 94 -0.677 242
Racine WI -1.068 284 0.044 137
Raleigh NC 1.7 13 1.173 24
Rapid City SD 0.702 54 0.509 80
Reading PA -1.037 280 -1.207 280
Redding CA -0.708 243 -0.317 198
Reno NV 0.591 62 0.628 63
Richmond VA -1.39 298 -0.359 205
Riverside CA 0.029 125 -0.037 153
Roanoke VA -0.671 233 -0.09 163
Rochester MN 0.574 66 1.402 13
Rochester NY -1.046 281 -0.985 266
Rockford IL -0.478 207 0.14 125
Rocky Mount NC -0.761 247 -0.571 228
Sacramento CA -0.349 183 -0.332 200
Saginaw MI -0.783 251 -1.549 295
Salem OR 0.495 70 -0.039 154
Salinas CA -0.27 174 -0.664 240
Salt Lake City UT 0.994 32 0.403 96
San Angelo TX -0.437 200 -0.123 170
San Antonio TX 0.613 59 -0.074 162
San Bernardino CA -0.595 222 -1.431 289
San Buenaventura CA -0.308 179 1.185 23
San Diego CA 0.019 127 0.663 58
San Francisco CA -0.302 178 1.626 9
San Jose CA 1.102 29 1.737 8
Santa Ana CA -0.402 192 -0.52 221
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Santa Barbara CA -0.583 221 0.928 37
Santa Cruz CA -0.435 199 0.907 39
Santa Fe NM 0.899 40 0.844 45
Santa Maria CA -0.457 203 -0.6 232
Santa Rosa CA 0.19 103 1.127 28
Sarasota FL 0.033 121 -0.066 159
Savannah GA -0.181 156 -0.639 238
Schenectady NY -1.468 300 -0.558 226
Scottsdale AZ 1.956 10 2.092 5
Scranton PA -0.792 252 -0.563 227
Seattle WA 0.49 72 1.296 17
Sheboygan WI -0.183 157 0.788 50
Shreveport LA -0.614 225 -0.76 247
Sioux City IA -0.412 194 0.562 75
Sioux Falls SD 0.711 52 1.222 20
South Bend IN -0.667 231 -0.292 196
Spokane WA 0.389 79 -0.237 188
Springfield IL -0.227 165 0.748 52
Springfield MA -0.952 270 -0.849 255
Springfield MO 0.326 85 -0.146 173
Springfield OH -0.849 262 -0.468 216
St. Cloud MN 0.577 65 0.672 57
St. Joseph MO -0.342 182 -0.115 168
St. Louis MO -0.993 276 -1.082 271
St. Paul MN -0.216 162 0.451 91
St. Petersburg FL -0.009 133 0.253 114
Stamford CT -0.232 167 1.97 6
Stockton CA -0.617 227 -1.049 269
Syracuse NY -1.286 297 -1.187 279
Tacoma WA 0.268 89 0.023 140
Tallahassee FL 0.368 80 -0.606 233
Tampa FL 0.188 104 -0.074 161
Tempe AZ 1.628 15 0.931 36
Terre Haute IN -0.688 240 -0.765 249
Thousand Oaks CA 0.268 88 2.474 3
Toledo OH -0.841 261 -0.285 194
Topeka KS -0.488 208 0.37 102
Trenton NJ -0.6 224 -1.033 268
Tucson AZ 0.485 74 -0.31 197
Tulsa OK -0.232 168 0.376 99
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Appendix: City Index Scores and Rankings for the 302 Dataset Cities (continued)
Rank: City City Rank: City 
City Economic Economic Residential Residential 
City State Condition Index Condition Index Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Tuscaloosa AL 0.453 75 -0.722 243
Tyler TX 0.16 107 -0.02 147
Utica NY -1.159 292 -1.126 275
Vallejo CA -0.693 241 0.534 76
Victoria TX -0.051 136 0.279 113
Vineland NJ -1.035 279 -0.138 172
Virginia Beach VA 0.332 83 1.401 14
Visalia CA -0.616 226 -0.032 151
Waco TX -0.137 150 -1.327 284
Warren OH -1.203 294 -0.818 252
Warwick RI -0.444 201 1.123 30
Washington DC -0.8 253 0.12 130
Waterloo IA -0.426 197 0.102 132
West Hartford CT -0.982 275 1.22 21
Wichita KS -0.355 184 0.623 64
Wichita Falls TX -0.712 244 0 146
Wilmington NC 1.216 26 -0.229 186
Winston-Salem NC -0.065 139 0.287 112
Worcester MA -0.619 228 -0.149 174
Yakima WA 0.105 113 -1.149 276
Youngstown OH -1.061 282 -1.658 296
Yuma AZ 0.764 46 -0.335 201
Rankings are out of 302 central cities.  A high index score indicates better economic health.
Rankings for the City Economic Condition index are out of 301 cities; Carson City, NV does not have an index score and was not ranked due to missing data
on the payroll and establishments variables.
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Endnotes
1. The principal city(s) of an area always includes the
largest incorporated place or census designated place,
as well as additional cities that meet population and
employment thresholds.Additional principal cities within
a metropolitan area include any with more than 250,000
people or 100,000 workers. Places with more than
50,000 can also be principal cities if the number of jobs
located there meets or exceeds the number of
employed residents. Finally, principal cities also include
places with more than 10,000 people that are at least
one-third the size of the largest place in the metro area,
and that have at least as many jobs as employed resi-
dents.
2. Due to data availability constraints, the annual payroll
and establishments variables were measured at the
county level.
3. We used z-scores to standardize the variables, and
summed the z-scores across the variables within each
index. For those variables for which a lower value indi-
cates a lesser degree of economic distress, such as
poverty rate, the signs on the z-scores were reversed
so that a higher z-score always indicated better eco-
nomic health.To get each city’s index scores, we divided
by the number of variables in the index.As a result, the
index scores for each index were on roughly the same
scale and could easily be compared.
4. The total population of older industrial cities in 2000
was 16,350,102.
5. The breakdown of older industrial cities by size roughly
mirrors that of the dataset as a whole.There is a slight
overrepresentation of older industrial cities with under
100,000 residents (49.2 percent vs. 45.0), with between
250,000 to 500,000 residents (15.4 percent vs. 12.6 per-
cent), and with between 500,000 to 1 million residents
(7.7 percent vs. 6.6 percent). Older industrial cities rep-
resent a smaller share of cities with between 100,000
and 250,000 residents than the number of these cities
in the dataset (27.7 percent vs. 32.8 percent), and the
same proportion of cities with populations over 1 mil-
lion (3.1 percent vs. 3.0 percent).
6. These 14 states are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
7. California and New York are tied with the third largest
number of these cities (7), though they represent a
much smaller share of California’s cities in the overall
dataset (33).
8. In only 32 percent of the remaining 237 cities in the
dataset was the share employed in manufacturing at
least 20 percent in 1970.
9. These 65 cities are indeed comparatively “old”, having
reached 50,000 in population over 40 years earlier on
average than the other 237 in the dataset.
10. The remaining 35 older industrial cities fell into one of
seven other Strong-Moderate-Weak groupings on the
two performance indexes.
11. Danville,VA was not ranked.These 46 cities were in 40
different metropolitan areas (some older industrial
cities were in the same metropolitan area).
12. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
State of the Cities Data Systems. Retrieved October 18,
2006 from socds.huduser.org/socds_home.html.
The data are aggregated by place of residence and are
based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) sys-
tem. Starting with the 2000 Census, industry data were
classified according to the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS). Consequently, the data
for 2000 had to be converted from NAICS to SIC.
For more on the conversion procedure used by HUD,
see: socds.huduser.org/CBPSE/note.htm.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Only eight of the 65 older industrial cities experienced
increases in manufacturing from 1970 to 2000—
Merced, Fresno, Stockton, San Bernardino, and Santa
Maria, CA; Odessa,TX; Rocky Mount, NC; and Pine
Bluff,AR. During this period, U.S. manufacturing employ-
ment dropped by 3.3 percent.
16. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
State of the Cities Data Systems.
17. Douglas E. Booth,“Long Waves and Uneven Regional
Growth,” Southern Economic Journal 53 (2) (1986):
448–458.
18. U.S. Congress, Office of Technological Assessment, The
Technological Reshaping of Metropolitan America
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).
The comparative growth rates of FIRE jobs are indica-
tive of these trends. From 1970 to 2000, the 237 other
sample cities saw a 188.7 percent average increase in
employment in this sector, considerably higher than the
27.1 percent average increase seen in the older indus-
trial cities; older industrial cities actually lost FIRE jobs
during the 1990s (-12.5 percent), while the other cities
continued to gain (13.3 percent).While these groups of
cities’ respective shares of FIRE jobs in 2000 weren’t
sweepingly different (5.5 percent in the older industrial
cities versus 6.4 percent in the other 237 cities), the 
disparities in overall growth rates make it apparent that
they are on very different economic trajectories.
(Numbers based on author’s calculations.)
19. Miriam King, Steven Ruggles,Trent Alexander, Donna
Leicach, and Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series, Current Population Survey:Version 2.0
(Minneapolis: Minnesota Population Center, 2004).
20. Institute for Higher Education Policy,“The Investment
Payoff:A 50-State Analysis of the Public and Private
Benefits of Higher Education” (2005).Those with a
Bachelor’s degree does not include those who have
attained an advanced degree as well.
21. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
“Brownfields Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,”
available at www.hud.gov/bfields/brownqa.cfm.
22. Oliver Gillham, The Limitless City (Washington: Island
Press, 2002).
23. Jordan Rappaport,“The Shared Fortunes of Cities and
Suburbs” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic
Review Third Quarter (2005).
24. William H. Frey,“Central City White Flight: Racial and
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Cities and Suburbs.” 
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